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Abstract 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest over the last decade in 
wireless and mobile computing research community.  Applications of WSNs are numerous 
and growing, which range from indoor deployment scenarios in the home and office to 
outdoor deployment in adversary’s territory in a tactical battleground. However, due to 
distributed nature and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to 
numerous security threats that can adversely affect their performance. This problem is more 
critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical 
battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios. Due 
to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large 
overhead of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Design and 
implementation of secure WSNs is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive discussion on the state of the art in security technologies for WSNs. 
It identifies various possible attacks at different layers of the communication protocol stack in 
a typical WSN and presents their possible countermeasures. A brief discussion on the future 
direction of research in WSN security is also included.  
 
 
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), Denial of service (DoS) attack, Sybil 
attack, Node replication attack, Traffic analysis attack, Secure routing protocol, Trust 
management, intrusion detection. 
1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of hundreds or even thousands of small devices 
each with sensing, processing, and communication capabilities to monitor the real-world 
environment. They are envisioned to play an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging 
from critical military surveillance applications to forest fire monitoring and building security 
monitoring in the near future [1]. In these networks, a large number of sensor nodes are 
deployed to monitor a vast field, where the operational conditions are most often harsh or even 
hostile. However, the nodes in WSNs have severe resource constraints due to their lack of 
processing power, limited memory and energy. Since these networks are usually deployed in 
remote places and left unattended, they should be equipped with security mechanisms to 
defend against attacks such as node capture, physical tampering, eavesdropping, denial of 
service, etc. Unfortunately, traditional security mechanisms with high overhead are not 
feasible for resource constrained sensor nodes. The researchers in WSN security have 
  
proposed various security schemes which are optimized for these networks with resource 
constraints. A number of secure and efficient routing protocols [2 - 5], secure data aggregation 
protocols [6 - 11] etc. has been proposed by several researchers in WSN security.  
In addition to traditional security issues like secure routing and secure data aggregation, 
security mechanisms deployed in WSNs also should involve collaborations among the nodes 
due to the decentralized nature of the networks and absence of any infrastructure. In real-world 
WSNs, the nodes can not be assumed to be trustworthy apriori. Researchers have therefore, 
focused on building a sensor trust model to solve the problems which are beyond the 
capabilities of traditional cryptographic mechanisms [12 - 19]. Since in most cases, the sensor 
nodes are unattended and physically insecure, vulnerability to physical attack is an important 
issue in WSNs. A number of propositions exist in the literature for defense against physical 
attack on sensor nodes [20 - 29].  
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive overview of various security issues in WSNs. 
First we outline the constraints of WSNs, security requirements in these networks, and various 
possible attacks and the corresponding countermeasures. Then a holistic view of the security 
issues is presented. These issues are classified into six categories: cryptography, key 
management, secure routing, secure data aggregation, intrusion detection and trust 
management. The advantages and disadvantages of various security protocols are discussed, 
compared and evaluated. Some open research issues in each of these areas are also discussed. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, various constraints in 
WSNs are discussed. Section 3 presents the security requirements in WSNs. Section 4 
discusses various attacks that can be launched on WSNs. Section 5 presents the numerous 
countermeasures for all possible attacks on WSNs. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper 
highlighting some future directions of research in WSN security. 
2. Constraints in Wireless Sensor Networks 
A WSN consists of a large number of sensor nodes that are inherently resource-constrained 
devices. These nodes have limited processing capability, very low storage capacity, and 
constrained communication bandwidth. These constraints are due to limited energy and 
physical size of the sensor nodes. Due to these constraints, it is difficult to directly employ the 
conventional security mechanisms in WSNs. In order to optimize the conventional security 
algorithms for WSNs, it is necessary to be aware about the constraints of sensor nodes [30]. 
Some of the major constraints of a WSN are listed below. 
Energy constraints: Energy is the biggest constraint for a WSN. In general, energy 
consumption in sensor nodes can be categorized in three parts: (i) energy for the sensor 
transducer, (ii) energy for communication among sensor nodes, and (iii) energy for 
microprocessor computation. The study in [31] found that each bit transmitted in WSNs 
consumes about as much power as executing 800 to 1000 instructions. Thus, communication 
is more costly than computation in WSNs. Any message expansion caused by security 
mechanisms comes at a significant cost. Further, higher security levels in WSNs usually 
correspond to more energy consumption for cryptographic functions. Thus, WSNs could be 
divided into different security levels depending on energy cost [32, 33].  
Memory limitations: A sensor is a tiny device with only a small amount of memory and 
storage space. Memory is a sensor node usually includes flash memory and RAM. Flash 
memory is used for storing downloaded application code and RAM is used for storing 
application programs, sensor data, and intermediate results of computations. There is usually 
not enough space to run complicated algorithms after loading the OS and application code. In 
  
the SmartDust project, for example, TinyOS consumes about 4K bytes of instructions, leaving 
only 4500 bytes for running security algorithms and applications [31]. A common sensor type- 
TelosB- has a 16-bit, 8 MHz RISC CPU with only 10K RAM, 48K program memory, and 
1024K flash storage [34]. The current security algorithms are therefore, infeasible in these 
sensors [35]. 
Unreliable communication: Unreliable communication is another serious threat to sensor 
security. Normally the packet-based routing of sensor networks is based on connectionless 
protocols and thus inherently unreliable. Packets may get damaged due to channel errors or 
may get dropped at highly congested nodes. Furthermore, the unreliable wireless 
communication channel may also lead to damaged or corrupted packets. Higher error rate also 
mandates robust error handling schemes to be implemented leading to higher overhead. In 
certain situation even if the channel is reliable, the communication may not be so. This is due 
to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, as the packets may collide in transit and 
may need retransmission [1]. 
Higher latency in communication: In a WSN, multi-hop routing, network congestion and 
processing in the intermediate nodes may lead to higher latency in packet transmission. This 
makes synchronization very difficult to achieve. The synchronization issues may sometimes 
be very critical in security as some security mechanisms may rely on critical event reports and 
cryptographic key distribution [36]. 
Unattended operation of networks: In most cases, the nodes in a WSN are deployed in 
remote regions and are left unattended. The likelihood that a sensor encounters a physical 
attack in such an environment is therefore, very high. Remote management of a WSN makes it 
virtually impossible to detect physical tampering. This makes security in WSNs a particularly 
difficult task.  
3. Security Requirements in Wireless Sensor Networks 
A WSN is a special type of network. It shares some commonalities with a typical computer 
network, but also exhibits many characteristics which are unique to it. The security services in 
a WSN should protect the information communicated over the network and the resources from 
attacks and misbehavior of nodes. The most important security requirements in WSN are listed 
below: 
Data confidentiality: The security mechanism should ensure that no message in the network 
is understood by anyone except intended recipient. In a WSN, the issue of confidentiality 
should address the following requirements [30, 35]: (i) a sensor node should not allow its 
readings to be accessed by its neighbors unless they are authorized to do so, (ii) key 
distribution mechanism should be extremely robust, (iii) public information such as sensor 
identities, and public keys of the nodes should also be encrypted in certain cases to protect 
against traffic analysis attacks. 
Data integrity: The mechanism should ensure that no message can be altered by an entity as 
it traverses from the sender to the recipient.  
Availability: This requirements ensures that the services of a WSN should be available 
always even in presence of an internal or external attacks such as a denial of service attack 
(DoS). Different approaches have been proposed by researchers to achieve this goal. While 
some mechanisms make use of additional communication among nodes, others propose use of 
a central access control system to ensure successful delivery of every message to its recipient.  
Data freshness: It implies that the data is recent and ensures that no adversary can replay old 
messages. This requirement is especially important when the WSN nodes use shared-keys for 
  
message communication, where a potential adversary can launch a replay attack using the old 
key as the new key is being refreshed and propagated to all the nodes in the WSN. A nonce or 
time-specific counter may be added to each packet to check the freshness of the packet. 
Self-organization: Each node in a WSN should be self-organizing and self-healing. This 
feature of a WSN also poses a great challenge to security. The dynamic nature of a WSN 
makes it sometimes impossible to deploy any pre-installed shared key mechanism among the 
nodes and the base station [37]. A number of key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed 
in the context of symmetric encryption [37 - 40]. However, for application of public-key 
cryptographic techniques an efficient mechanism for key-distribution is very much essential. 
It is desirable that the nodes in a WSN self-organize among themselves not only for multi-hop 
routing but also to carryout key management and developing trust relations.  
Secure localization: In many situations, it becomes necessary to accurately and 
automatically locate each sensor node in a WSN. For example, a WSN designed to locate 
faults requires accurate locations of sensor nodes to identify the faults. A potential adversary 
can easily manipulate and provide false location information by reporting false signal strength, 
replaying messages etc. if the location information is not secured properly. The authors in [41] 
have described a technique called verifiable multi-lateration (VM). In multi-lateration, the 
position of a device is accurately computed from a series of known reference points. The 
authors have used authenticated ranging and distance bounding to ensure accurate location of 
a node. Because of the use of distance bounding, an attacking node can only increase its 
claimed distance from a reference point. However, to ensure location consistency, the attacker 
would also have to prove that its distance from another reference point is shorter. As it is not 
possible for the attacker to prove this, it is possible to detect the attacker. In [42], the authors 
have described a scheme called secure range-independent localization (SeRLoC). The scheme 
is a decentralized range-independent localization scheme. It is assumed that the locators are 
trustworthy and cannot be compromised by any attacker. A sensor computes its location by 
listening to the beacon information sent by each locator which includes the locator’s location 
information. The beacon messages are encrypted using a shared global symmetric key that is 
pre-distributed in the sensor nodes. Using the information from all the beacons that a sensor 
node receives, it computes its approximate location based on the coordinates of the locators. 
The sensor node then computes an overlapping antenna region using a majority vote scheme. 
The final location of the sensor node is determined by computing the center of gravity of the 
overlapping antenna region.  
Time synchronization: Most of the applications in sensor networks require time 
synchronization. Any security mechanism for WSN should also be time-synchronized. A 
collaborative WSN may require synchronization among a group of sensors. In [43], a set of 
secure synchronization protocols have been proposed. 
Authentication: It ensures that the communicating node is the one that it claims to be. An 
adversary can not only modify data packets but also can change a packet stream by injecting 
fabricated packets. It is, therefore, essential for a receiver to have a mechanism to verify that 
the received packets have indeed come from the actual sender node. In case of communication 
between two nodes, data authentication can be achieved through a message authentication 
code (MAC) computed from the shared secret key. A number of authentication schemes for 
WSNs have been proposed by researchers, most of which are for secure routing.  
 
 
 
  
4. Security Vulnerabilities in Wireless Sensor Networks 
WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. These attacks can be broadly categorized as 
follows [44]: 
• Attacks on secrecy and authentication: standard cryptographic techniques can protect 
the secrecy and authenticity of communication channels from outsider attacks such as 
eavesdropping, packet replay attacks, and modification or spoofing of packets. 
• Attacks on network availability: attacks on availability are often referred to as 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks may target any layer of a sensor network. 
• Stealthy attack against service integrity: in a stealthy attack, the goal of the attacker is to 
make the network accept a false data value. For example, an attacker compromises a 
sensor node and injects a false data value through that sensor node. 
 
In these attacks, keeping the sensor network available for its intended use is essential. DoS 
attacks against WSNs may permit real-world damage to the health and safety of people [29]. 
The DoS attack usually refers to an adversary’s attempt to disrupt, subvert, or destroy a 
network. However, a DoS attack can be any event that diminishes or eliminates a network’s 
capacity to perform its expected functions [29].  
4.1 Denial of service attacks 
Wood et al. have defined a DoS attack as an event that diminishes or attempts to reduce a 
network’s capacity to perform its expected function [29]. There are several standard 
techniques existing in the literature to cope with some of the more common denial of service 
attacks, although in a broader sense, development of a generic defense mechanism against 
DoS attacks is still an open problem. Moreover, most of the defense mechanisms require high 
computational overhead and hence not suitable for resource-constrained WSNs. Since DoS 
attacks in WSNs can sometimes prove very costly, researchers have spent a great deal of effort 
in identifying various types of such attacks, and devising strategies to defend against them. 
Some important types of DoS attacks in WSNs are discussed below. 
4.1.1 Physical layer attacks 
The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal 
detection, modulation, and data encryption [1]. As with any radio-based medium there exists 
the possibility of jamming in WSNs. There are two broad categories of attack on WSNs in the 
physical layer: (i) jamming and (ii) tampering. They are described as follows. 
Jamming: it is a type of attack which interferes with the radio frequencies that the nodes use 
in a WSN for communication [29, 44]. A jamming source may be powerful enough to disrupt 
the entire network. Even with less powerful jamming sources, an adversary can potentially 
disrupt communication in the entire network by strategically distributing the jamming sources. 
An intermittent jamming may also prove detrimental [29]. 
Tampering: sensor networks typically operate in outdoor environments. Due to unattended 
and distributed nature, the nodes in a WSN are highly susceptible to physical attacks [45]. The 
physical attacks may cause irreversible damage to the nodes. The adversary can extract 
cryptographic keys from the captured node, tamper with its circuitry, modify the program 
codes or even replace it with a malicious sensor [28]. It has been shown that sensor nodes such 
as MICA2 motes can be compromised in less than one minute time [22]. 
 
  
4.1.2 Link layer attacks 
The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of data-streams, data frame detection, medium 
access control, and error control [1]. Attacks at this layer include purposefully created 
collisions, resource exhaustion, and unfairness in allocation. A collision occurs when two 
nodes attempt to transmit on the same frequency simultaneously [29]. When packets collide, 
they are discarded and need to be retransmitted. An adversary may strategically cause 
collisions in specific packets such as ACK control messages. A possible result of such 
collisions is the costly exponential back-off. The adversary may simply violate the 
communication protocol and continuously transmit messages in an attempt to generate 
collisions. Repeated collisions can also be used by an attacker to cause resource exhaustion 
[29]. For example, a naïve link layer implementation may continuously attempt to retransmit 
the corrupted packets. Unless these retransmissions are detected early, the energy levels of the 
nodes would be exhausted quickly. Unfairness is a weak form of DoS attack [29]. An attacker 
may cause unfairness by intermittently using the above link layer attacks. In this case, the 
adversary causes degradation of real-time applications running on other nodes by 
intermittently disrupting their frame transmissions. 
4.1.3 Network layer attacks 
The network layer of WSNs is vulnerable to the different types of attacks such as: (i) spoofed 
routing information, (ii) selective packet forwarding, (iii) sinkhole, (iv) Sybil, (v) wormhole, 
(vi) blackhole and grayhole, (vii) HELLO flood, (viii) Byzantine,  (ix) information disclosure, 
(x) acknowledgment spoofing etc. These attacks are described briefly in the following: 
Spoofed routing information: the most direct attack against a routing protocol is to target the 
routing information in the network. An attacker may spoof, alter, or replay routing information 
to disrupt traffic in the network [46]. These disruptions include creation of routing loops, 
attracting or repelling network traffic from selected nodes, extending or shortening source 
routes, generating fake error messages, causing network partitioning, and increasing 
end-to-end latency. 
Selective forwarding: in a multi-hop network like a WSN, for message communication all 
the nodes need to forward messages accurately. An attacker may compromise a node in such a 
way that it selectively forwards some messages and drops others [46].  
Sinkhole: In a sinkhole attack, an attacker makes a compromised node look more attractive 
to its neighbors by forging the routing information [29, 46, 47]. The result is that the neighbor 
nodes choose the compromised node as the next-hop node to route their data through. This 
type of attack makes selective forwarding very simple as all traffic from a large area in the 
network would flow through the compromised node. 
Sybil attack: it is an attack where one node presents more that one identity in a network. It 
was originally described as an attack intended to defeat the objective of redundancy 
mechanisms in distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks [48]. Newsome et al 
describe this attack from the perspective of a WSN [47]. In addition to defeating distributed 
data storage systems, the Sybil attack is also effective against routing algorithms, data 
aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, and foiling misbehavior detection. Regardless of 
the target (voting, routing, aggregation), the Sybil algorithm functions similarly. All of the 
techniques involve utilizing multiple identities. For instance, in a sensor network voting 
scheme, the Sybil attack might utilize multiple identities to generate additional “votes”. 
Similarly, to attack the routing protocol, the Sybil attack would rely on a malicious node 
taking on the identity of multiple nodes, and thus routing multiple paths through a single 
malicious node. 
  
Wormhole: a wormhole is low latency link between two portions of a network over which 
an attacker replays network messages [46]. This link may be established either by a single 
node forwarding messages between two adjacent but otherwise non-neighboring nodes or by a 
pair of nodes in different parts of the network communicating with each other. The latter case 
is closely related to sinkhole attack as an attacking node near the base station can provide a 
one-hop link to that base station via the other attacking node in a distant part of the network. 
Blackhole and Grayhole: in the blackhole attack, a malicious node falsely advertises good 
paths (e.g., the shortest path or the most stable path) to the destination node during the 
path-finding process (in reactive routing protocols), or in the route update messages (in 
proactive routing protocols). The intention of the malicious node could be to hinder the 
path-finding process or to intercept all data packets being sent to the destination node 
concerned. A more delicate form of this attack is known as the grayhole attack, where the 
malicious node intermittently drops data packets thereby making its detection more difficult.  
HELLO flood: most of the protocols that use HELLO packets make the naïve assumption 
that receiving such a packet implies that the sender is within the radio range of the receiver. An 
attacker may use a high-powered transmitter to fool a large number of nodes and make them 
believe that they are within its neighborhood [46]. Subsequently, the attacker node falsely 
broadcasts a shorter route to the base station, and all the nodes which received the HELLO 
packets, attempt to transmit to the attacker node. However, these nodes are out of the radio 
range of the attacker. 
     Byzantine attack: in this attack, a compromised node or a set of compromised nodes works 
in collusion and carries out attacks such as creating routing loops, forwarding packets in 
non-optimal routes, and selectively dropping packets [49]. Byzantine attacks are very difficult 
to detect , since under such attacks the networks usually do not exhibit any abnormal behavior. 
     Information disclosure: a compromised node may leak confidential or important 
information to unauthorized nodes in a network. Such information may include information 
regarding the network topology, geographic location of nodes, or optimal routes to authorized 
nodes in the network. 
     Reource-depletion attack: in this type of attack, a malicious node tries to deplete resources 
of other nodes in a network. The typical resources that are targeted are: battery power, 
bandwidth, and computational power. The attacks could be in the form of unnecessary 
requests for routes, very frequent generation of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets 
to other nodes. 
Acknowledgment spoofing: some routing algorithms for WSNs require transmission of 
acknowledgment packets. An attacking node may overhear packet transmissions from its 
neighboring nodes and spoof the acknowledgments thereby providing false information to the 
nodes [46]. In this way, the attacker is able to disseminate wrong information in the network 
about the status of the nodes, since some acknowledgment may arrive from nodes which are 
not alive in reality. 
    In addition to above categories of attacks, there are various types of possible attacks on the 
routing protocols in WSNs. Most of the routing protocols in WSNs are vulnerable to attacks 
such as: routing table overflow, routing table poisoning, packet replication, route cache 
poisoning, rushing attacks etc. A comprehensive discussion on these attacks have been done in 
[50]. 
4.1.4 Transport layer attacks 
The attacks that can be launched on the transport layer in a WSN are flooding attack and 
de-synchronization attack.  
  
Flooding: Whenever a protocol is required to maintain state at either end of a connection, it 
becomes vulnerable to memory exhaustion through flooding [29]. An attacker may repeatedly 
make new connection request until the resources required by each connection are exhausted or 
reach a maximum limit. In either case, further legitimate requests will be ignored. 
De-synchronization: De-synchronization refers to the disruption of an existing connection 
[29]. An attacker may, for example, repeatedly spoof messages to an end host causing the host 
to request the retransmission of missed frames. If timed correctly, an attacker may degrade or 
even prevent the ability of the end hosts to successfully exchange data causing them instead to 
waste energy attempting to recover from errors which never really exist. The possible DoS 
attacks and the corresponding countermeasures are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Attacks on various layers of a WSN and their countermeasures 
Layer Attacks Defense 
Physical Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower duty cycle, 
region mapping, mode change 
Link Collision 
Exhaustion 
Unfairness 
Error-correcting code 
Rate limitation 
Small frames 
Network Spoofed routing information 
& Selective forwarding 
Sinkhole 
Sybil 
Wormhole 
HELLO Flood 
 
Acknowledgment flooding 
Egress filtering, authentication, monitoring 
 
Redundancy probing 
Authentication, monitoring, redundancy 
Authentication, probing 
Authentication, packet leashes by using geographic and 
temporal info 
Authentication, verify the bi-directional link 
authentication 
Transport Flooding 
De-synchronization 
Client puzzles 
Authentication 
Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 2- 23, 2006. 
4.2 Attacks on secrecy and authentication 
There are different types of attacks under this category. They are described in Sections 4.2.1 
through 4.2.2. 
4.2.1 Node replication attack 
In a node replication attack, an attacker attempts to add a node to an existing WSN by 
replication (i.e. copying) the node identifier of an already existing node in the network [51]. A 
node replicated and joined in the network in this manner can potentially cause severe 
disruption in message communication in the WSN by corrupting and forwarding the packets in 
wrong routes. This may also lead to network partitioning and communication of false sensor 
readings. In addition, if the attacker gains physical access to the entire network, it is possible 
for him to copy the cryptographic keys and use these keys for message communication from 
the replicated node. The attacker can also place the replicated node in strategic locations in the 
network so that he could easily manipulate a specific segment of the network, possibly causing 
a network partitioning. 
4.2.2 Attacks on privacy 
Since WSNs are capable of automatic data collection through efficient and strategic 
deployment of sensors, these networks are also vulnerable to potential abuse of these vast data 
  
sources. Privacy preservation of sensitive data in a WSN is particularly difficult challenge [52]. 
Moreover, an adversary may gather seemingly innocuous data to derive sensitive information 
if he knows how to aggregate data collected from multiple sensor nodes. This is in analogy to 
the panda hunter problem, where the hunter can accurately estimate the location of the panda 
by systematically monitoring the traffic [53]. 
The privacy preservation in WSNs is even more challenging since these networks make 
large volumes of information easily available through remote access mechanisms. Since the 
adversary need not be physically present to carryout the surveillance, the information 
gathering process can be done anonymously with a very low risk. In addition, remote access 
allows a single adversary to monitor multiple sites simultaneously [54].  
Following are some of the common attacks on sensor data privacy [52, 54]:  
 
• Eavesdropping and passive monitoring: This is most common and easiest form of 
attack on data privacy. If the messages are not protected by cryptographic mechanisms, 
the adversary could easily understand the contents. Packets containing control 
information in a WSN convey more information than accessible through the location 
server, Eavesdropping on these messages prove more effective for an adversary. 
• Traffic analysis: In order to make an effective attack on privacy, eavesdropping should 
be combined with a traffic analysis. Through an effective analysis of traffic, an 
adversary can identify some sensor nodes with special roles and activities in a WSN. 
For example, a sudden increase in message communication between certain nodes 
signifies that those nodes have some specific activities and events to monitor. Deng et al 
have demonstrated two types of attacks that can identify the base station in a WSN 
without even underrating the contents of the packets being analyzed in traffic analysis 
[55].  
• Camouflage: An adversary may compromise a sensor node in a WSN and later on use 
that node to masquerade a normal node in the network. This camouflaged node then 
may advertise false routing information and attract packets from other nodes for further 
forwarding. After the packets start arriving at the compromised node, it starts 
forwarding them to strategic nodes where privacy analysis on the packets may be 
carried out systematically. 
  
It may be noted from the above discussion that WSNs are vulnerable to a number of attacks 
at all layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack. However, as pointed out by authors in [56], there 
may be other types of attacks possible which are not yet identified. Securing a WSN against all 
these attacks may be a quite challenging task. 
5. Security Mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks 
In this section, defense mechanism for combating various types of attacks on WSNs will be 
discussed. First, different cryptographic mechanisms for WSNs are presented. Both public key 
cryptography and symmetric key cryptographic techniques are discussed for WSN security. A 
number of key management protocols for WSNs are discussed next. Various methods of 
defending against DoS attacks, secure broadcasting mechanisms and various secure routing 
mechanisms are also discussed. In addition, various mechanisms for defending the Sybil 
attack, node replication attack, traffic analysis attacks, and attacks on sensor privacy are also 
presented. Finally, intrusion detection mechanisms for WSNs, secure data aggregation 
mechanisms and various trust management schemes for WSN security are discussed. 
  
5.1 Cryptography in WSNs 
Selecting the most appropriate cryptographic method is vital in WSNs as all security services 
are ensured by cryptography. Cryptographic methods used in WSNs should meet the 
constraints of sensor nodes and be evaluated by code size, data size, processing time, and 
power consumption. In this section, we focus on the selection of cryptography in WSNs. We 
discuss public key cryptography first, followed by symmetric key cryptography. 
5.1.1 Public key cryptography in WSNs 
Many researchers believe that the code size, data size, processing time, and power 
consumption make it undesirable for public key algorithm techniques, such as the 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [57] or RSA signatures [58], to be employed in WSNs. 
 
Table 2. Public key cryptography: average ECC and RSA execution times 
Algorithm Operation Time (s) 
ECC secp160r1 
ECC secp224r1 
RSA-1024 public key e = 216 + 1 
RSA-1024 private key  (with Chinese Remainder Theorem) 
RSA-2048 public key e = 216 + 1 
RSA-2048 private key (with Chinese Remainder Theorem) 
0.81 
2.19 
0.43 
10.99 
1.94 
83.26 
Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Comm. Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006 
Public key algorithms such as RSA are computationally intensive and usually execute 
thousands or even millions of multiplication instructions to perform single cryptographic 
operation. Further, a microprocessor’s public key algorithm efficiency is primarily determined 
by the number of clock cycles required to perform a multiplication instruction [30]. Brown et 
al. found that public key algorithms such as RSA usually require on the order of tens of 
seconds and up to minutes to perform encryption and decryption operations in 
resource-constrained wireless devices, which exposes a vulnerability to DoS attacks [59]. On 
the other hand, Carman et al found that it usually takes a microprocessor thousands of 
nano-joules to do a simple multiplication function with a 128-bit result [30]. In contrast, 
symmetric key cryptographic algorithms and hash functions consume much less 
computational energy than public key algorithms. For example, the encryption of a 1024-bit 
block consumes approximately 42mj on MC68328 DragonBall processor using RSA, and the 
estimated energy consumption for a 128-bit AES block is a much lower at 0.104 mj [30]. 
Studies have shown that it is feasible to apply public key cryptography to sensor networks 
by using the right selection of algorithms and associated parameters, optimization, and low 
power techniques [60 - 62]. The investigated public key algorithms include Rabin’s Scheme 
[63], Ntru-Encrypt [64], RSA [58], and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [65, 66]. Most 
studies in the literature focus on RSA and ECC algorithms. The attraction of ECC is that it 
offers equal security for a far smaller key size, thereby reducing processing and 
communication overhead. For example, RSA with 1024-bit keys (RSA-1024) provides a 
currently accepted level of security for many applications and is equivalent in strength to ECC 
with 160-bit keys (ECC-160) [67]. To protect data beyond the year 2010, RSA Security 
recommends RSA-2048 as the new minimum key size, which is equivalent to ECC with 
224-bit keys (ECC-224) [68]. Table 2 summarizes the execution of ECC and RSA on an 
Atmel  ATmega128 processor (used by Mica2 mote) [23]. The execution time is measured on 
  
average for a point multiplication in ECC and a modular exponential operation in RSA. ECC 
secp160r1 and secp224r1 are two standardized elliptic curves defined in [69]. As shown in 
Table 2, by using the small integer e = 216 + 1 as the public key, RSA public key operation is 
slightly faster than ECC point multiplication. However, ECC point multiplication outperforms 
RSA private key operation by an order of magnitude. Since the RSA private key operations are 
too slow, they have limited use in sensor network applications. ECC has no such issues 
because both the public key operation and private key operation use the same point 
multiplication operations. 
 
Table 3. Public Key Cryptography: Average Energy Costs of Digital Signature and Key Exchange in 
Millijoules (mJ) 
Algorithm 
Signature Key Exchange 
Sign Verify Client Server 
RSA-1024 
ECDSA-160 
RSA-2048 
ECDSA-224 
304 
22.82 
2302.7 
61.54 
11.9 
45.09 
53.7 
121.98 
15.4 
22.3 
57.2 
60.4 
304 
22.3 
2302.7 
60.4 
Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Comm. Surveys and Tutorials, Vol 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006 
[171] 
Wander et al. investigated the energy cost of authentication and key exchange based on 
RSA and ECC cryptography on an Atmel ATmega128 processor [62]. The result is shown in 
Table 3. The ECC-based signature is generated and verified with the elliptic curve digital 
signature algorithm (ECDSA) [70]. The key exchange protocol is a simplified version of the 
SSL handshake, which involves two parties: a client initiating the communication and a server 
responding to the initiation [71]. The WSN is assumed to be administered by a central point 
with each sensor having a certificate signed by the central point’s private key using an RSA or 
ECC signature. In the handshake process, the two parties verify each other’s certificate and 
negotiate the session key to be used in the communication. As Table 3 shows, compared with 
RSA cryptography at the same security level, ECDSA signatures are significantly cheaper 
than RSA signatures. Further, the ECC-based key exchange protocol outperforms the 
RSA-based key exchange protocol at the server side, and there is almost no difference in the 
energy cost for these two key exchange protocols at the client side. In addition, the relative 
performance advantage of ECC over RSA increases as the key size increases in terms of the 
execution time and energy cost. Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that ECC is more appropriate 
than RSA for use in sensor networks.  
The implementation of RSA and ECC cryptography on Mica2 [31] nodes further proved 
that a public key-based protocol is viable for WSNs. In [72], Watro et al. have described a 
system named TinyPK where RSA system has been implemented on Mica2 motes using 
TinyOS development environment. The authors have demonstrated that authentication and 
key agreement protocol can be efficiently realized by this scheme in resource-constrained 
sensor nodes. Another scheme- TinyECC [73] based on ECC have been designed and 
implemented on Mica2. Similar work was also conducted by Malan et al. on ECC 
cryptography using a Mica2 mote [67]. In their work, ECC was used to distribute a single 
symmetric key for the link layer encryption provided by the TinySec module [74]. 
Although public key cryptography is possible in the sensor nodes, private key operations are 
still expensive. The assumptions mentioned in the literature [57-61] may not be satisfied in 
some applications. For example, the work in [57-61] concentrated on the public key operations 
  
only, assuming the private key operations will be performed by a base station or a third party. 
By selecting appropriate parameters, for example, using the small integer e = 216 + 1 as the 
public key, the public key operation time can be extremely fast while the private key operation 
time does not change. The limitation of private key operation occurring only at a base station 
makes many security services using public key algorithms not available under these schemes. 
Such services include peer-to-peer authentication and secure data aggregation. 
 
Table 4. Symmetric key cryptography: average RC5 and Skipjack execution times 
Algorithm Operation Time (s) 
Skipjack (C) [75] 
RC5 (C, assembly) [76] 
0.38 
0.26 
Source: Y.Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Comm. Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006 
 
Table 5. Symmetric key cryptography: average energy for AES and SHA-1 
Algorithm Operation Time (s) 
SHA-1  (C) [77] 
AES-128 Encryption / Decryption (assembly) [78] 
5.9 µJ / byte 
1.62 / 2.49 µJ / byte 
Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Comm. Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006 
 
In contrast, Table 4 and Table 5 show the execution time and energy cost of two symmetric 
cryptography protocols on an Atmet ATmega128 processor. In Table 4, the execution time 
was measured on a 64-bit block using an 80-bit key. From the Table 4, we can see that 
symmetric key cryptography is faster and consumes less energy when compared to public key 
cryptography. 
5.1.2 Symmetric key cryptography in WSNs 
Since most of the public key cryptographic mechanisms are computationally intensive, most 
of the research studies for WSNs focus on use of symmetric key cryptographic techniques. 
Symmetric key cryptographic mechanisms use a single shared key between the two 
communicating host which is used both for encryption and decryption. However, one major 
challenge for deployment of symmetric key cryptography is how to securely distribute the 
shared key between the two communicating hosts. This is a non-trivial problem since 
pre-distributing the key may not always be feasible.   
Five popular encryption schemes RC4 [79], RC5 [76], IDEA [79], SHA-1 [77], and MD5 
[79, 80], were evaluated on six different microprocessors ranging in word size from 8-bit 
(Atmel AVR) to 16-bit (Mitsubishi M16C) to 32-bit widths (StrongARM, XScale) in [81]. 
The execution time and code memory size were measured for each algorithm and platform. 
The experiments indicated uniform cryptographic cost for each encryption class and each 
architecture class. The impact of caches was negligible while Instruction Set Architecture 
(ISA) support is limited to specific effects on certain algorithms. Moreover, hashing 
algorithms (e.g., MD5, SHA-1) incur almost an order of magnitude higher overhead than 
encryption algorithms (e.g., RC4, RC5, and IDEA). 
In [82], Law et al. evaluated two symmetric key algorithms: RC5 and TEA [83]. They 
further evaluated six block ciphers: RC5, RC6 [84], Rijndael [78], MISTY1 [85], KASUMI 
[86], and Camellia [87] on IAR Systems’ MSP430F149 in [82]. The benchmark parameters 
were code, data memory, and CPU cycles. The evaluation results are presented in Table 6, in 
  
which the algorithms are ranked based on the key setup and encryption mode used. In both 
cases, the algorithms are optimized for speed of execution and memory space requirement and 
then ranked on the basis of their speed of execution, code size and data size in memory. The 
evaluation results showed that Rijndael is suitable for high security and energy efficiency 
requirements and MISTY1 is suitable for good storage and energy efficiency.  
The performance of symmetric key cryptography is mainly decided by the following 
factors: 
 
• Embedded data bus width: many encryption algorithms prefer 32-bit word arithmetic, 
but most embedded processors usually use an 8-bit or 16-bit wide data bus. 
• Instruction set: the ISA has specific effects on certain algorithms. For example, most 
embedded processors do not support the variable-bit rotation instruction like rotate bit 
left (ROL) of the Intel architecture which greatly improves the performance of RC5. 
 
Table 6. A summary of cipher performance on sensor nodes [81] 
By Key Steps 
 
Rank 
Size Optimized Speed Optimized 
Code Memory Data Memory Speed Code Memory Data Memory Speed 
1 RC5-32 MISTY1 MISTY1 RC6-32 MISTY1 MISTY1 
2 KASUMI Rijndael Rijndael KASUMI Rijndael Rijndael 
3 RC6-32 KASUMI KASUMI RC5-32 KASUMI KASUMI 
4 MISTY1 RC6-32 Camellia MISTY1 RC6-32 Camellia 
5 Rijndael RC5-32 RC5-32 Rijndael Camellia RC5-32 
6 Camellia Camellia RC6-32 Camellia RC5-32 RC6-32 
By Encryption (CBC/CFB/OFB/CTR) 
 
Rank 
Size Optimized Speed Optimized 
Code Memory Data Memory Speed Code Memory Data Memory Speed 
1 RC5-32 RC5-32 Rijndael RC6-32 RC5-32 Rijndael 
2 RC6-32 MISTY1 MISTY1 RC5-32 MISTY1 Camellia 
3 MISTY1 KASUMI KASUMI MISTY1 KASUMI MISTY1 
4 KASUMI RC6-32 Camellia KASUMI RC6-32 RC5-32 
5 Rijndael Rijndael RC6-32 Rijndael Rijndael KASUMI 
6 Camellia Camellia RC5-32 Camellia Camellia RC6-32 
 
Source: Ganesan, P., et al., In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Conference on Wireless 
Sensor Networks and Applications, ACM Press, New York, 151-59, 2003.  
 
Selecting the appropriate cryptography method for sensor nodes is fundamental to provide 
security services in WSNs. However, the decision depends on the computation and 
communication capability of the sensor nodes. Open research issues range from cryptographic 
algorithms to hardware design as described below: 
 
• Recent studies on public key cryptography have demonstrated that public key 
operations may be practical in sensor networks. However, private key operations are 
still too expensive in terms of computation and energy cost to accomplish in a sensor 
  
node. The application of private key operations to sensor nodes needs to be studied 
further. 
• Symmetric key cryptography is superior to public key cryptography in terms of speed 
and low energy cost. However, the key distribution schemes based on symmetric key 
cryptography are not perfect. Efficient and flexible key distribution schemes need to be 
designed.  
• It is also likely that more powerful motes will need to be designed to support the 
increasing requirements on computation and communication in sensor nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Key management protococls in WSNs: a taxonomy [171] 
5.2 Key management protocols 
The area that has received maximum attention of the researchers in WSN security is key 
management. Key management is a core mechanism to ensure security in network services 
and applications in WSNs. The goal of key management is to establish the keys among the 
nodes in a secure and reliable manner. In addition, the key management scheme must support 
node addition and revocation in the network. Since the nodes in WSNs have computational 
and power constraints, the key management protocols for these networks must be extremely 
light-weight. Most of the existing key management protocols for WSNs are based on 
symmetric key cryptography because public key cryptographic techniques are in general 
computationally intensive. Figure 1 presents a taxonomy of key management protocols in 
WSNs as described in [171]. In this Section, a brief overview of some of the most important 
key management protocols is given. 
5.2.1 Key management protocol based on network structure 
Depending on the underlying network structure, the key management protocols in WSNs may 
be centralized or distributed. In a centralized key management scheme, there is only one entity 
that controls the generation, re-generation, and distribution of keys. This entity is called key 
distribution center (KDC). The only protocol existing in the literature that is based on 
centralized key distribution is the LKHW scheme [88]. LKHW is based on logical key 
hierarchy (LKH). In this scheme, the base station is treated as a KDC and all keys are logically 
distributed in a tree rooted at the base station. The main drawback of this scheme is its single 
point of failure. If the central controller fails, the entire network and its security will be 
affected. The lack of scalability is another issue. Moreover, it does not provide data 
  
authentication. In the distributed key management protocols, different controllers are used to 
manage key-related activities. These protocols do not have the vulnerability of single point of 
failure and they allow better scalability. Most of the key management protocols existing in the 
literature are distributed in nature. These schemes fall either in deterministic or in probabilistic 
categories and are discussed in Section 5.2.2.1 and Section 5.2.2.2 respectively.  
5.2.2 Key management protocols based on probability of key sharing 
The key management protocols for WSNs may be classified on the probability of key sharing 
between a pair of sensor nodes. Depending of this probability the key management schemes 
may be either deterministic or probabilistic. 
5.2.2.1 Deterministic key distribution schemes 
The localized encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP) proposed by Zhu et al. [89] is a 
key management protocol for WSNs based on symmetric key algorithms. It uses different 
keying mechanisms for different packets depending on their security requirements. Four types 
of keys are established for each node: (i) an individual key shared with the base station 
(pre-distributed), (ii) a group of key shared by all the nodes in the network (pre-distributed), 
(iii) pair-wise key shared with immediate neighbor nodes, and (iv) a cluster key shared with 
multiple neighbor nodes. The pair-wise keys shared with immediate neighbor nodes are used 
to protect peer-to-peer communication and the cluster key is used for local broadcast.  
It is assumed that the time required to attack a node is greater than the network 
establishment time, during which a node can detect all its intermediate neighbors. A common 
initial key is loaded into each node before deployment. Each node derives a master key which 
depends on the common key and its unique identifier. Nodes then exchange HELLO messages, 
which are authenticated by the receivers (since the common key and identifier are known, the 
master key of the neighbor can be computed). The nodes then compute a shared key based on 
their master keys. The common key is erased in all nodes after the completion of the key 
distribution process, and by assumption, no node has been compromised up to this point. Sine 
no adversary can get the common key, it is impossible to inject false data or decrypt the earlier 
exchange messages. Also, no node can later forge the master key of any other node. In this way, 
pair-wise shared keys are established between all immediate neighbors. The cluster key is 
established by a node after the pair-wise key establishment. A node generates a cluster key and 
sends it encrypted to each neighbor with its pair-wise shared key. The group key can be 
pre-loaded, but should be updated once any compromised node is detected. This could be done, 
in a naïve way, the base station’s sending the new group key to each node using its individual 
key, or a hop-by-hop basis using cluster keys. Other sophisticated algorithms have been 
proposed for the same. Further, the authors [89] have proposed methods for establishing 
shared keys between multi-hop neighbors.  
Lai et al. have proposed a broadcast session key (BROSK) negotiation protocol [90]. 
BROSK assumes a master key shared by all the nodes in the network. To establish a session 
key with its neighbor node B, a sensor node A broadcasts a key negotiation message and both 
arrive at a shared session key. BROSK is a scalable and energy-efficient protocol. 
Cametepe et al. have proposed a deterministic key distribution scheme for WSNs using 
combinatorial design theory [91]. The combinatorial design theory based pair-wise key 
pre-distribution (CDTKeying) scheme is based on block design techniques in combinatorics. 
It employs symmetric and generalized quadrangle design techniques. The scheme uses a finite 
projective plane of order n (for prime power of n) to generate a symmetric design with 
parameters n2 + n + 1, n + 1, 1. The design supports n2 + n + 1 nodes and uses a key pool of size 
  
n
2
 + n +1. It generates n2 + n + 1 key chains of size n + 1 where every pair of key chains has 
exactly one key in common, and every key appears in exactly n + 1 key-chains. After the 
deployment, every pair of nodes finds exactly one common key. Thus, the probability of key 
sharing among a pair of sensor nodes is unity. The disadvantage of this proposition is that the 
parameter n has to be a prime power. Therefore, all network sizes can be supported for a fixed 
key chain size. 
Lee et al. have proposed two combinatorial design theory based deterministic schemes: 
ID-based one-way function scheme (IOS) and deterministic multiple space Bloms’ scheme 
(DMBS) [92]. They further discussed the use of combinatorial set systems in the design of 
deterministic key pre-distribution schemes for WSNs in [93]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The PIKE scheme: sensor nodes are organized in a two-dimensional space  
 
Chan et al. have proposed a deterministic key management protocol to facilitate key 
establishment between every pair of neighboring nodes in a WSN [94]. In the mechanism, 
known as peer intermediaries for key establishment (PIKE), all N sensor nodes are organized 
into a two-dimensional space as in Figure 2, where the coordinate of each node is (x, y) for x, 
y ε {0, 1,.. √N – 1}. Each node shares unique pair-wise keys with 2(√N – 1) nodes that have the 
same x or y coordinate in the two-dimensional space. For two nodes with no common 
coordinate, an intermediate node, which has a common x or y coordinate with both nodes, is 
used as a router to forward a key from them. However, the communication overhead of the 
scheme is rather high because the secure connectivity is only 2 / √N, which means that each 
node must establish a key for almost each of its neighbors through multi-link paths. 
Huang et al. [95] have proposed a hybrid key establishment scheme that exploits the 
difference in computational and energy between a sensor node and the base station in a WSN. 
The authors argue that an individual sensor node possesses far less computational power and 
energy than a base station. In light of this, they propose placing the major cryptographic 
computations on the base station. On the sensor side, light-weight symmetric-key operations 
are deployed. Every sensor node and the base station mutually authenticate each other based 
on the ECC protocol. The proposed mechanism also uses certificates to establish the 
legitimacy of a public key. The certificates are based on an elliptic curve scheme. Such 
certificates are useful to verify the authenticity of sensor nodes.  
Zhou and Fang [96] have developed a scalable key agreement protocol that uses a t-degree 
(k + 1)-variate symmetric polynomial to establish keys in a deterministic way. 
5.2.2.2 Probabilistic key distribution schemes 
Most of the key management protocols for WSNs are probabilistic and distributed schemes. 
Eschenauer et al. have proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme for WSNs that relies on 
  
probabilistic key sharing among nodes of a random graph [37]. The mechanism has three 
phases: key pre-distribution, shared key discovery, and path key establishment. In the key 
pre-distribution phase, each sensor is equipped with a key ring stored in its memory. The key 
ring consists of k keys which are randomly drawn from a large pool of P keys. The association 
information of the key identifiers in the key ring and sensor identifier is also stored at the base 
station. Each sensor node shares a pair-wise key with the base station. In the shared key 
discovery phase, each sensor discovers its neighbors with which it shares keys. The authors 
have suggested two methods for this purpose. The simplest method is for each node to 
broadcast a list of identifiers of the keys in their key rings in plaintext allowing neighboring 
nodes to check whether they share a key. However, the adversary may observe the key-sharing 
patterns among sensors in this way. The second method uses the challenge-response technique 
to hide key-sharing patterns among nodes from an adversary. Finally, in the path key 
establishment phase, a path key is assigned for those sensor nodes within the communication 
range and not sharing a key, but connected by two or more links at the end of the second phase. 
If a node is compromised, the base station can send a message to all other sensors to revoke the 
compromised node’s key ring. Re-keying follows the same procedure as revocation. The 
messages from the base station are signed by the pair-wise key shared by the base station and 
sensor nodes, thus ensuring that no adversary can forge a station. If a node is compromised, the 
attacker has a probability of approximately k/P to attack any link successfully. Since k << P, it 
only affects a small number of sensor nodes. 
Eschenauer et al.’s work can be considered as the basic random key management scheme. A 
number of additional key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed [38, 40, 97 - 100]. 
In the basic random key management scheme, any two neighbor nodes need to find a single 
common key from their key rings to establish a secure link in the key setup phase. However, 
Chan et al. observed that increasing the amount of key overlap in the key ring can increase the 
resilience of the network against node capture [38]. The authors have proposed q-composite 
random key pre-distribution scheme. It is required to share at least q common keys in the key 
setup phase to build a secure link between any two neighbor nodes. Further, they introduced a 
key update phase to enhance the basic random key management scheme. Suppose A has a 
secure link to B after the key setup phase and the secure key is k from the key pool P. Since k 
may be residing in the key ring memory of some other nodes in the network, the security of the 
link between A and B is jeopardized if any of those nodes are captured. Thus, it is better to 
update the communication key between A and B instead of using a key in the key pool. To 
address this problem, the authors have presented a multi-path key reinforcement for the key 
update. An adversary in this case has to eavesdrop on all the disjoint paths between node A and 
node B if he wants to reconstruct the communication key. The security of the scheme is further 
augmented by a random pair-wise key management scheme for node-to-node authentication.  
To discover whether the key sets of two nodes have an intersection, usually both nodes need 
to broadcast their key indices or find common keys through a challenge-response procedure. 
Such methods have very high communication overhead. De Pietro et al. [98] improved the 
basic random key management scheme by associating the key indices of a node with its 
identity. For example, each node is assigned a pseudo-random number generator g(x, y) and 
the key indices for the node are computed as g(ID, i) for i = 1, 2,….N, where ID is the node 
identity. In this way, other nodes can find out which key is in its key set by checking its node 
identity.  
Blundo et al. presented a polynomial-based key pre-distribution protocol for group key 
pre-distribution that can be adapted to WSNs [101]. The key setup server randomly generates 
a bivariate t-degree polynomial defined as: 
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The t-degree polynomial is defined over a finite field Ғq, where q is a prime that is large 
enough to accommodate a cryptographic key. By choosing aij = aji, a symmetric polynomial is 
arrived at, i.e. f(x, y) = f(y, x). Each sensor node is assumed to have a unique, integer-valued, 
non-zero identity. For each sensor node u, a polynomial share f(u, y) is assigned, which means 
the coefficients of univariate polynomials f(u, y) are loaded into the node u’s memory. When 
nodes u and v need to establish a shared key, they broadcast heir IDs. Subsequently, node u can 
compute f(u, v) by evaluating f(u, y) at y = v, and node v can also compute f(v, u) by evaluating 
f(v, y) at y = u. Due to the polynomial symmetry, the shared key between nodes u and v has 
been established as  Kuv = f(u, v) = f(v, u). A t-degree bivariate polynomial is also (t + 1)-secure. 
Therefore, an adversary must compromise no less than (t + 1) nodes holding the shares of the 
same polynomial to reconstruct it.  
Liu et al. have proposed a polynomial pool-based key pre-distribution (PPKP) scheme in 
[40]. The scheme also involves three phases: setup, direct key establishment, and path key 
establishment. In the setup phase, the setup server randomly generates a set F of bivariate 
t-degree polynomials over the finite field Ғq. For each sensor node, the setup server picks up a 
subset of polynomials FFi ⊆ and assigns the polynomial shares of these polynomials to node 
i. In the direct key establishment stage [172], the sensor nodes finds a shared polynomial with 
other sensor nodes and then establish a pair-wise key using the polynomial-based key 
pre-distribution scheme discussed in [101]. The general framework based on polynomial 
pool-based pair-wise key pre-distribution can be applied in various ways. The authors [40] 
have provided two examples. In the random subset assignment strategy, during the setup phase, 
a setup server selects a random subset of polynomial shares to each sensor. In the second 
strategy-the grid-based key pre-distribution strategy- the setup server assigns a polynomial 
share to each node that is determined based on a grid structure. The grid-based key 
pre-distribution scheme is more resilient to a possible node compromise attack.  
Du et al. have presented a multiple-space key pre-distribution (MSKP) scheme [97] which 
uses Blom’s method [172]. The key difference between the schemes proposed in [40] and [97] 
is that the scheme in [40] is based on a set of bivariate t-degree polynomials, while the scheme 
in [97] is based on Blom’s method. The proposed scheme allows any pair of nodes in a 
network to be able to find a pair-wise secret key. As long as no more than λ nodes are 
compromised, the network is perfectly secure. To use Blom’s method, during the 
pre-deployment phase, the base station first constructs a (λ + 1) x N matrix G over a finite field 
GF(q), where N is the size of the network and G is considered to be public information. Then 
the base station creates a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D over GF(q), and 
computes an N x (λ + 1) matrix A = (D . G)T, where (D . G)T is the transpose of D. G. Matrix D 
needs to be kept secret, and should not be disclosed to adversaries.  It is easy to verify that A . 
G is a symmetric matrix as follows. 
 
                            A . G  =  (D . G)T . G  =  GT . DT . G  =  GT . D . G  = (A . G)T                                 (2) 
 
Therefore, Kij = Kji. The idea is to use Kij (or Kji) as the pair-wise key between node i and 
node j. To carry out the above computation, in the pre-distribution phase for any sensor node k 
the following two steps are carried out: (i) the k-th row of matrix A is stored at node k, and (ii) 
the k-th column of matrix G is stored at node k. Then nodes i and j need to find the pair-wise 
  
key between them, they first exchange their columns of G, and then compute Kij and Kji, 
respectively, using their private rows of A. 
In the proposed scheme, each sensor node is loaded with G and τ distinct D matrices drawn 
from a large pool of ω symmetric matrices D1,….. Dω of size (λ + 1) x (λ + 1). For each Di, 
calculate the matrix Ai = (Di . G)T and store the j-th row of Ai at this node. After deployment, 
each node needs to discover whether it shares any space with neighbors. If they found out that 
they have a common space, the nodes can follow Blom’s method to build a pair-wise key. The 
scheme is scalable and flexible. Moreover, it is substantially more resilient against node 
capture as compared to the scheme proposed in [40]. 
In the above scheme, each sensor node needs to keep many key materials such that a pair of 
nodes shares a key with a probability that can guarantee that the entire network is almost 
connected. This causes a large storage overhead on memory-constrained sensor nodes. Hwang 
et al. [39] proposed to enhance the basic random key management protocol [37] by reducing 
the amount of key-related materials required to be stored in each node, while guaranteeing a 
certain probability of sharing a key between two nodes. Their idea is to guarantee secure 
connectivity in the largest sub-component of the network rather than the entire network. The 
probability that two nodes have a key in common is reduced, but it is still large enough for the 
largest network component to be connected.  
Hwang et al. extended the basic random key management scheme and proposed a cluster 
key grouping scheme [100]. They further analyzed the trade-offs involved between energy, 
memory, and security robustness. 
In all the key management schemes discussed so far, the key materials are uniformly 
distributed in the entire terrain of a network. The uniform distribution makes the probability 
that two neighbor nodes share a direct key, called secure connectivity, rather small. Therefore, 
a lot of communication overhead is inevitable for the establishment of indirect keys. If some 
location information is known, two nearby sensor nodes can be preloaded with the same set of 
key materials. In this way, secure connectivity may be improved to a large extent. 
In the location-based key pre-distribution (LBKP) scheme [102], the entire WSN is divided 
into many square cells. Each cell is associated with a unique t-degree bivariate polynomial. 
Each sensor node is pre-loaded with shares of the polynomials of its home cell and four other 
cells horizontally and vertically adjoining its home cells. After deployment, any two neighbor 
nodes can establish a pair-wise key if they have shares of the same polynomial. For example, 
in Figure 3, polynomial of cell C33 is also assigned to cells C32, C34, C23, and C43. The 
polynomials of other cells are assigned in the same way. As a result, a node in C33 has some 
polynomial information in common with other nodes in the shaded areas. 
Du et al. [99] have also proposed a key pre-distribution scheme that uses network 
deployment knowledge. In the proposed scheme, the entire network is divided into many 
square cells. Each cell is assigned a subset key pool Sij, i = 1,….u and j = 1,….v out of a global 
key pool S. Those subset key pools are set up such that the key pools of two neighbor cells will 
share a portion of keys. In each cell, the basic random key management scheme [37] is applied. 
Using the deployment knowledge- the information about the manner in which the nodes are 
deployed in the network- the scheme ensures that the value of the probability that a pair o 
neighboring nodes share a secret key is very high. The high value of the probability signifies 
that any pair of nodes in the network can establish secure communication sessions between 
them. The intelligent use of the deployment knowledge also ensures that the size of the key 
ring (i.e., the set of keys) held by a given node in the proposed scheme [99] is much smaller 
than that in the basic key management scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [37]. 
Hence, the scheme is very memory-efficient.  
  
 
Fig. 3. The location-based key distribution (LBKP) scheme  
 
Some of the above-mentioned key management schemes for WSNs are classified and 
compared in Table 7. Although a number of key management protocols have been proposed 
for WSNs, the design of key management protocols is still largely open to research. Some of 
the open research issues are discussed below. 
 
Table 7. Classification and comparison of key management protocols in WSNs [103] 
Prot. 
Type 
Protocol 
Name 
Ref Master 
Key 
Pairwise 
Key 
Path 
Key 
Cluster 
Key 
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Load 
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All pairwise  NA Yes No No Low Low Low Low High 
LEAP  [89] Yes Yes Yes Yes Good Low Low Low Low 
BROSK [90] Yes Yes No No Good Low Low Low Low 
LKHW [88] Yes Yes No Yes Fair Low Low Low Low 
CDTKeying [91] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
IOS & 
DMBS 
[92] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lis
tic
 
           
Basic [37] NA Yes Yes No Good Good Med Med High 
q-composite [38] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Polynomial 
based 
[40] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Blom based [97] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Deployment 
knowledge 
based 
[99] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Cluster key 
grouping 
[100] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med High 
Location 
based 
[102] NA Yes No No Good Good Med Med Med 
 
Memory: High security and lower overhead are two objectives that a key management 
protocol needs to achieve. Although there have been several proposals for key establishment 
in sensor networks, they can hardly address these two requirements. Strong security protocols 
usually require large amounts of memory cost, as well as high-speed processors and large 
power consumption. However, they cannot be easily supported due to the constraints on 
hardware resources of the sensor platform. It is well known that in wireless environment, 
transmission of one bit can consume more energy than computing one bit. In key management 
protocols, direct key establishment does not require communication or only a few rounds of 
one-hop communication, but indirect key establishment is performed over multi-hop 
communication. To reduce the multi-hop communication overhead, the probability of a direct 
key establishment between a pair of nodes should be as high as possible so that a secure 
connectivity among the nodes can be guaranteed. However, highly secure connectivity 
requires more key materials in each node, which is usually impractical, especially when the 
network size is large. Considering the above two issues, memory cost can be a major 
  
bottleneck in designing key management protocols in a WSN. How to reduce memory cost 
while still maintaining a certain level of security is a very important issue. 
End-to-end security: The major merit of symmetric key cryptography is its computational 
efficiency. However, most current symmetric key schemes for WSNs aim at the link layer 
security- not the transport layer security- because it is impractical for each node to store a 
transport layer key for each of the other nodes in a network due to huge number of nodes. 
However, end-to-end communication at the transport layer is very common in many WSN 
applications. For example, to reduce unnecessary traffic, a fusion node can aggregate reports 
from many source nodes and forward a final report to the sink node. During this procedure, the 
reports between source nodes and the fusion node and the one between the fusion node and the 
sink node should be secured. In hostile environments, however, any node can be compromised. 
Of one of the intermediate nodes along a route is compromised, the message delivered along 
the route can be exposed or modified by the compromised node. Employing end-to-end 
security can effectively prevent message tampering by any malicious intermediate node. 
Compared with symmetric key technology, public key cryptography is expensive but has 
flexible manageability and supports end-to-end security. A more promising approach to key 
establishment in WSNs is to combine the merits of both symmetric key and public key 
techniques, in that each node is equipped with a public key system and relies on it to establish 
end-to-end symmetric keys with other nodes. To achieve this goal, a critical issue is to develop 
more efficient public key algorithms and their implementations so that they can be widely used 
on sensor platforms. How to prove the authenticity of public keys is another important 
problem. A malicious node can otherwise, impersonate any normal node by claiming its public 
key. Identity-based cryptography is a shortcut to avoid the problem. Currently, most 
identity-based cryptographic algorithms operate on elliptic curve-fields, and pairing over 
elliptic curves is widely used in the establishment of identity-based symmetric keys. However, 
the pairing operation is very costly, comparable to or even more expensive than RSA. 
Therefore, fast algorithms and implementations are the major tasks for the researchers. 
Efficient symmetric key algorithms: There is still a demand for the development of more 
efficient symmetric key algorithms because encryption and authentication based on symmetric 
keys are very frequent in the security operations of sensor nodes. For example, in the link layer 
security protocol TinySec [74], each packet must be authenticated, and encryption can also be 
triggered if critical packets are transmitted. Therefore, fast and cost-efficient symmetric key 
algorithms should be developed. 
Key update and revocation: Once a key has been established between two nodes, the key 
can act as a master key and be used to derive different sub-keys for many purposes (e.g., 
encryption and authentication0. If each key is used for a long time, it may be exposed due to 
cryptanalysis over the ciphertexts intercepted by adversaries. To protect the master key and 
those sub-keys from cryptanalysis, it is wise to update keys periodically. The period of update, 
however, is difficult to choose. Because the cryptanalysis capability of adversaries is unknown, 
it is very difficult to estimate how long it takes for adversaries to expose a key by cryptanalysis. 
If the key update period is too long, the corresponding key may also be exposed. If it is too 
short, frequent updates can incur large overhead. A related problem is key revocation. If one 
node is detected to be malicious, its key must be revoked. However, key revocation has not 
been thoroughly investigated. Although Chan et al. [104] proposed a distributed revocation 
protocol, it is only based on the random pair-wise key scheme [38], and cannot easily be 
generalized to fit other key establishment protocols. 
Node compromise: Node compromise is the most detrimental attack on sensor networks. 
Because compromised nodes have all the authentic key materials, hey can result in very severe 
  
damage to WSN applications and cannot be detected easily. How to counteract node 
compromise remains an open problem. Most of the current security protocols attempt to 
minimize the adverse impact on the network due to a possible node compromise through 
careful protocol design such that the impact of node compromise can be restricted to a small 
area. However, a hardware approach is more promising. With advances in hardware design 
and manufacturing techniques, much stronger, tamper-resistant, and cheaper devices can be 
installed on the sensor platform to counteract node compromise. 
5.3 Defense against DoS attacks 
Various types of DoS attacks in WSNs have been discussed in Section 4. In this section, 
defense mechanisms for each of those attacks are presented in detail. 
5.3.1 Defense mechanisms in the physical layer 
Jamming attack may be defended by employing variations of spread-spectrum communication 
such as frequency hopping and code spreading [29]. Frequency-hopping spread spectrum 
(FHSS) is a method of transmitting signals by rapidly switching a carrier among many 
frequency channels using a pseudo-random sequence known to both the transmitter and the 
receiver. As a potential attacker would not be able to predict the frequency selection sequence, 
it will be impossible for him to jam the frequency being used at a given point of time.  Code 
spreading is another technique for defending against jamming. However, it requires greater 
design complexity and energy and thus not very suitable for WSNs. In general, sensor devices 
are limited to single-frequency use and are highly susceptible to jamming attacks. One 
approach for tolerance against jamming attack in a WSN is to identify the jammed part of the 
network and effectively avoid it by routing around. Wood et al. [29] have proposed an 
approach where the nodes along the perimeter of a jammed region report their status to the 
neighbors and collectively the affected region is identified and packets are routed around it. 
5.3.2 Defense mechanisms in the link layer 
A typical defense against collision attack is the use of error-correcting codes [29]. Most codes 
work best with low levels of collisions such as those caused by environmental or probabilistic 
errors. However, these codes also add additional processing and communication overhead. It 
is reasonable to assume that an attacker will always be able to corrupt more than what can be 
corrected. Although it is possible to detect these malicious collisions, no complete defense 
mechanism against them is kwon today. 
A possible solution for energy exhaustion attack is to apply a rate limiting MAC admission 
control. This would allow the network to ignore those requests that intend to exhaust the 
energy reserves of a node. A second technique is to use time-division multiplexing where each 
node is allotted a time slot in which it can transmit [29]. This eliminates the need of arbitration 
for each frame and can solve the indefinite postponement problem in a back-off algorithm. 
However, it is still susceptible to collisions.  
The effect of unfairness caused by an attacker who intermittently launches link layer attacks 
can be lessened by use of small frames since it reduces the amount of time an attacker gets at 
his disposal to capture the communication channel [29]. However, this technique often 
reduces efficiency and is susceptible to further unfairness such as an attacker trying to 
retransmit quickly instead of randomly delaying. 
 
  
5.3.3 Defense mechanisms in the network layer 
A countermeasure against spoofing and alteration is to append a message authentication code 
(MAC) after the message. By adding a MAC to the message, the receivers can verify whether 
the messages have been spoofed or altered. To defend against replayed information, counters 
or time-stamps may be introduced in the messages [35]. A possible defense against selective 
forwarding attack is using multiple paths to send data [46]. A second defense is to detect the 
malicious node or assume it has failed and seek an alternative route. 
    Sen et al. have presented a cooperative detection scheme for identifying malicious packet 
dropping nodes in an ad hoc network [105]. The scheme exploits the redundancy in routing 
information in an ad hoc network to build a robust detection framework so that it works even 
in presence of transient network partitioning and Byzantine failure of nodes. 
Hu et al. have proposed a novel and generic mechanism called packet leashes for detecting 
and defending against wormhole attacks [106]. In a wormhole attack, a malicious node 
eavesdrops on a series of packets, then tunnels them through a path in the network, and replays 
them. This is done in order to make a false representation of the distance between the two 
colluding nodes. It is also used, more generally, to disrupt the routing protocol by misleading 
the neighbor discovery process [46]. Hu et al. have presented a mechanism that employs 
directional antenna to combat wormhole attack [23]. Wang et al. have used a visualization 
approach to detect wormholes in a WSN [107]. In the mechanism proposed by the authors, a 
distance estimation is made between all the sensor nodes in a neighborhood. Using 
multi-dimensional scaling, a virtual layout of the network is then computed, and a surface 
smoothing strategy is used to adjust the round-off errors. Finally, the shape of the resulting 
virtual network is analyzed. If any wormhole exists, the shape of the network will bend and 
curve towards the wormhole; otherwise, the network will appear flat. Sen et al. have presented 
a security mechanism that can detect cooperative grayhole attacks in a wireless ad hoc and 
sensor network [108]. In this scheme, every node monitors the packet forwarding behavior of 
each of its neighbors and a global detection algorithm is employed to detect any routing 
misbehavior. 
To defend against flooding DoS attack at the transport layer, Aura et al. have proposed using 
client puzzles [109], where each client should demonstrate its commitment to the connection 
by solving a puzzle. As an attacker does not have infinite resource, it will be impossible for 
him to create new connections fast enough to cause resource starvation on the serving node. A 
possible defense against de-synchronization attack is to enforce a mandatory requirement of 
authentication of all packets communicated between nodes [29]. If the authentication 
mechanism is secure, an attacker will be unable to send any spoofed messages.  
Some mechanisms for secure multicasting and broadcasting in WSNs are now discussed. 
5.3.3.1 Secure broadcasting and multicasting protocols 
Multicasting and broadcasting techniques are used primarily to reduce the communication and 
management overhead of sending a single message to multiple receivers. In order to ensure 
that only legitimate group members receive the multicast and broadcast communication, 
appropriate authentication and encryption mechanisms must be in place. To handle this 
problem, several key management schemes have been devised: centralized group key 
management protocols, decentralized key management protocols, and distributed key 
management protocols [110]. First, we will discuss some generic security mechanisms for 
multicast and broadcast communication in wireless networks. Then we will present some of 
the well-known propositions specific to WSNs. 
  
In the case of the centralized group key management protocols, a central authority is used to 
maintain the group. Decentralized management protocols, however, divide the task of group 
management amongst multiple nodes. In distributed key management protocols, the key 
management activity is distributed among a set of nodes rather than on a single node. In some 
cases, the entire group of nodes is responsible for key management [110]. 
An efficient way to distribute keys in a network is to use a logical key tree. Such techniques 
essentially fall under the category of centralized key management protocols. Some schemes 
have been developed for WSNs based on logical key tree technique [88,111, 112]. While 
centralized solutions are not always the most efficient ones, these mechanisms may sometimes 
be very effective for WSNs, as relatively heavier computations can be usually carried out in 
powerful base stations  
Di Pietro et al. have proposed a directed diffusion-based multicast mechanism for WSNs 
that utilizes a logical key hierarchy [88]. In the logical hierarchy, a central key distributor is at 
the root of a tree, and the nodes in the network are the leaf level. The internal nodes of tree 
contain keys that are used in the re-keying process. The directed diffusion is an 
energy-efficient data dissemination technique for WSNs [113]. In directed diffusion, a query 
is transformed into an interest and then diffused throughout the network. The source node then 
starts collecting data from the network based on the propagated interest. The dissemination 
technique also sets up certain gradients designed to draw events toward the interest. The 
collected data is then sent back to the source along the reverse path of the interest propagation. 
The directed diffusion-based logical key hierarchy scheme as proposed by Di Pietro et al. 
allows nodes to join and leave groups. The key hierarchy is used to effectively re-establish 
keys for the nodes below the node that has left the group. When a node declares its intension to 
join a group, a key set is generated for the new node based on the keys within the existing key 
hierarchy.  
Kaya et al. discuss the problem of multicast group management in [114], where the nodes in 
a network are grouped based on their locality and a security tree is constructed on the groups.  
Lazos et al. have presented a tree-based key distribution scheme that is similar to the 
directed diffusion-based logical key hierarchy proposed by Di Pietro et al. [112]. In their 
proposed scheme, a routing-aware tree is constructed in which the leaf nodes are assigned keys 
based on all relay nodes above them. As the scheme takes advantage of routing information for 
construction the key hierarchy, it is more energy-efficient than routing schemes that arbitrarily 
arrange nodes into a routing tree.   
In [111], the authors have proposed a mechanism that uses geographic location information 
for construction of a logical key hierarchy for secure multicast communication. The nodes, 
based on the geographical location information, are grouped into different clusters. The nodes 
within a cluster are able to reach each other with a single hop communication. Using the 
cluster information, a key hierarchy is constructed in a manner similar to that proposed in 
[112]. 
5.4 Defense against attacks on routing protocols 
Many routing protocols have been proposed for WSNs. These protocols can be divided into 
three broad categories according to the network structure: (i) Flat structure-based routing, (ii) 
hierarchical structure-based routing, and (iii) location-based routing [115]. In flat-based 
routing, all nodes are typically assigned equal roles or functionality. In hierarchical-based 
routing, nodes play different roles in the network. In location-based routing, sensor node 
positions are used to route data in the network. One common location-based routing protocol 
is the greedy perimeter stateless routing (GPSR) [3]. It allows nodes to send packets to a 
  
region rather than a particular node. All these routing protocols are vulnerable to various types 
of attacks such as selective forwarding, sinkhole attack etc as mentioned in Section 4.  
Elaborate discussions on various types of attacks on the routing protocols in WSNs are given 
in [46] and [50]. A comparative analysis of some of the well known existing secure routing 
protocols for WSNs has been presented in [50]. 
The goal of a secure routing protocol for a WSN is to ensure the integrity, authentication, 
and availability of messages. Most of the existing secure routing algorithms for WSNs are 
based on symmetric key cryptography except the one described by Du et al. [116], which is 
based on public key cryptography. In this section, a number of security mechanisms for 
routing in WSNs are discussed in detail. 
µTESLA (the “micro” version of the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant 
Authentication protocol) [9] and its extensions [117, 118] have been proposed to provide 
broadcast authentication for sensor networks. µTESLA is broadcast authentication protocol 
which was proposed by Perrig et al. for the security protocols for sensor networks (SPINS) 
protocol [35]. µTESLA introduces asymmetry through a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys 
resulting in an efficient broadcast authentication scheme. For its operation, it requires the base 
station and the sensor nodes to be loosely synchronized. In addition, each node must know an 
upper bound on the maximum synchronization error.  
To send an authenticated packet, the base station simply computes a MAC on the packet 
with a key that is secret at that point of time. When a node gets a packet, it can verify that the 
corresponding MAC key was not yet disclosed by the base station. Because a receiving node is 
assured that the MAC key is known only to the base station, the receiving node is assured that 
no adversary could have altered the packet in transit. The node stores the packet in a buffer. At 
the time of key disclosure, the base station broadcasts the verification key to all its receivers. 
When a node receives the disclosed key, it can easily verify the correctness of the key. If the 
key is correct, the node can now use it to authenticate the packet stored in its buffer. Each 
MAC is a key from the key chain, generated by a public one-way function F. To generate the 
one-way key chain, the sender chooses the last key Kn from the chain, and repeatedly applies F 
to compute all other keys: Ki = F(Ki+1). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of time-released key chain for source authentication [171] 
 
Figure 4 shows an example of µTESLA. The receiver node is loosely time synchronized and 
knows K0 in an authenticated way. Packets P1 and P2 sent in interval 1 contain a MAC with a 
key K1. Packet P3 has a MAC using key K2. If P4, P5, and P6 are all lost, as well as the packet 
that disclosed the key K1, the receiver cannot authenticate P1, P2, and P3. In interval 4, the base 
station broadcasts the key K2, which the nodes authenticate by verifying K0 = F(F(K2)), and 
hence know also K1 = F(K2), so they can authenticate packets P1, P2 with K1, and P3 with K2. 
SPINS limits the broadcasting capability to only the base station. If a node wants to broadcast 
authenticated data, the node has to broadcast the data through the base station. The data is first 
sent to the base station in an authenticated way. It is then broadcasted by the base station. 
To bootstrap a new receiver, µTESLA depends on a point-to-point authentication 
mechanism in which a receiver sends a request message to the base station and the base station 
  
replies with a message containing all the necessary parameters. It may be noted that µTESLA 
requires the base station to unicast initial parameters to individual sensor nodes, and thus 
incurs a long delay to boot up a large-scale sensor network. Liu et al. propose a multi-level key 
chain scheme for broadcast authentication to overcome this deficiency [117, 118].  
The basic idea in [117, 118] is to predetermine and broadcast the initial parameters required 
by µTESLA instead of using unicast-based message transmission. The simplest way is to 
pre-distribute the µTESLA parameters with a master key during the initialization of the sensor 
nodes. As a result, all sensor nodes have the key chain commitments and other necessary 
parameters once they are initialized, and are ready to use µTESLA as long as the staring time 
has passed. Furthermore, the authors have introduced a multi-level key chain scheme, in which 
the higher key chains are used to authenticate the commitments of the lower-level ones. 
However, the multi-level key chain suffers from possible DoS attacks during commitment 
distribution stage. Further, none of the µTESLA or multi-level key chain schemes is scalable in 
terms of the number of senders. In [119], a practical broadcast authentication protocol has 
been proposed to support a potentially large number of broadcast senders using µTESLA as a 
building block. 
µTESLA provides broadcast authentication for base stations, but is not suitable for local 
broadcast authentication. This is because µTESLA does not provide immediate authentication. 
For every received packet, a node has to wait for one µTESLA interval to receive the MAC key 
used in computing the MAC for the packet. As a result, if µTESLA is used for local broadcast 
authentication, a message traversing l hops will take at least l µTESLA intervals to arrive at the 
destination. In addition, a sensor node has to buffer all unverified packets. Both the latency and 
the storage requirements limit the scheme for authenticating infrequent messages broadcast by 
the base station. Zhu et al. have proposed a one-way key chain scheme for one-hop broadcast 
authentication [89]. The mechanism is known as LEAP. In this scheme, every node generates 
a one-way key chain of certain length and then transmits the commitment (i.e., first key) of the 
key chain to each neighbor, encrypted with their pair-wise shared key. Whenever a node has a 
message to send, it attaches to the message the next authenticated key in the key chain. The 
authenticated keys are disclosed in reverse order to their generation. A receiving neighbor can 
verify the message based on the commitment or an authenticated key it received from the 
sending node more recently.  
Deng et al. have proposed an intrusion tolerant routing protocol in wireless sensor networks 
(INSENS) that adopts a routing-based approach to security in WSNs [2]. It constructs routing 
tables in each node, bypassing malicious nodes in the network. The protocol can not totally 
rule out attack on nodes, but it minimizes the damage caused to the network. The computation, 
communication, storage, and bandwidth requirements at the nodes are reduced, but at the cost 
of greater computation and communication at the base station. To prevent DoS attacks, 
individual nodes are not allowed to broadcast to the entire network. Only the base station is 
allowed to broadcast, and the base station is authenticated using one-way hash function so as 
to prevent any possible masquerading by a malicious node. Control information pertaining to 
routing is authenticated by the base station in order to prevent injection of false routing data. 
The base station computes and disseminates routing tables, since it does not have 
computational and energy constraints. Even if an intruder takes over a node and does not 
forward packets, INSENS uses redundant multipath routing, so that the destination can still 
reach without passing through the malicious node. 
INSENS has two phases: route discovery and data forwarding. During the route discovery 
phase, the base station sends a request message to all nodes in the network by multi-hop 
forwarding. Any node receiving a request message records the identity of the sender and sends 
  
the message to all its immediate neighbors if it has not already done so. Subsequent request 
messages are used to identify the senders as neighbors, but repeated flooding is not performed. 
The nodes respond with their local topology by sending feedback messages. The integrity of 
the messages is protected using encryption by a shared key mechanism. A malicious node can 
inflict damage only by not forwarding packets, but the messages are sent through different 
neighbors, so it is likely that a message reaches a node by at least one path. Hence, the effect of 
malicious nodes is not totally eliminated, but it is restricted to only a few downstream nodes in 
the worst case. Malicious nodes may also send spurious messages and cause battery drain for a 
few downstream nodes. Finally, the base station calculates forwarding tables for all nodes, 
with two independent paths for each node, and sends them to the nodes. The second phase of 
data forwarding takes place based on the forwarding tables computed by the base station.  
SPINS is a suite of security protocols optimized for sensor networks [35]. SPINS includes 
two building blocks: (i) secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and (ii) micro version of 
timed efficient streaming loss-tolerant authentication protocol (µTESLA). SNEP provides data 
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data freshness for peer-to-peer 
communication (node to base station). µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast as discussed 
already.  
SPINS assumes that each node is pre-distributed with a master key K which is shared with 
the base station at its time of creation. All the other keys, including a key Kencr for encryption, 
a key Kmac for MAC generation, and a key Krand for random number generation are derived 
from the master key using a string one-way function. SPINS uses RC5 protocol for 
confidentiality. If A wants to send a message to base station B, the complete message A sends 
to B is: 
 
                                    A  B : D<KencrC>, MAC(Kmac, C | D) <KencrC>                                       (3) 
 
In the above expression, D is the transmitted data and C is a shared counter between the 
sender and the receiver for the block cipher in counter mode. The counter C is incremented 
after each message is sent and received by the sender and the receiver respectively. SNEP also 
provides a counter exchange protocol to synchronize the counter value in both sides.  
SNEP provides the flowing properties: 
 
• Semantic security: the counter value is incremented after each message and thus the 
same message is encrypted differently each time. 
• Data authentication: a receiver can be assured that the message originated from the 
claimed sender if the MAC verification produces positive results.  
• Replay protection: the counter value in the MAC prevents replaying old messages by an 
adversary. 
• Weak freshness: SPINS identifies two types of freshness. Weak freshness provides 
partial message ordering and carries no delay information. Strong freshness provides a 
total order on a request-response pair and allows delay estimation. IN SNEP, the 
counter maintains a message ordering in the receiver side and yields weak freshness. 
SNEP guarantees weak freshness only, since there is no guarantee to node A that a 
message was created by node B in response to an event in node A.  
• Low communication overhead: the counter state is kept at each endpoint and need not be 
sent in each message. 
 
  
Inspired by the work on public key cryptography [60 - 62, 72], Du et al. have investigated 
the public key authentication problem [116]. The use of public key cryptography eases many 
problems in secure routing, for example, authentication and integrity. However, before a node 
A uses the public key from another node B, A must verify that the public key is actually B’s, i.e., 
A must authenticate B’s public key; otherwise, a man-in-the-middle attacks are possible. In 
general networks, public key authentication involves a signature verification on a certificate 
signed by a trusted third party certificate authority (CA) [120]. However, the signature 
verification operations are very expensive operations for sensor nodes. Du et al. have proposed 
an efficient alternative that uses only one-way hash function for the public key authentication. 
The proposed scheme can be divided into two stages. In the pre-distribution stage, A Merkle 
tree R is constructed with each leaf Li corresponding to a sensor node. Let pki represent node 
i’s public key, V be an internal tree node, and Vleft and Vright be V’s two children. The value of 
an internal tree node is denoted by Φ. The Merkle tree can then be constructed as follows: 
  
Φ (Li) = h (idi,  pki) for i = 1,….N 
                                                  Φ(V) = h (Φ(Vleft) || Φ(Vright))                                                   (4) 
 
In the above expressions, “||” represents the concatenation of two strings and h is a one-way 
hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1. Let R be the root of the tree. Each sensor node v needs 
to store the root value Φ(R) and the sibling node values λ1,……. λH along the path from v to R. 
If node A wants to authenticate B’s public key, B sends its public key pk along with the value 
of λ1,……. λH to node A. Then, A can use the same procedure to reconstruct the Merkle tree R` 
and calculate the root value Φ(R`). A will trust B to be authentic if Φ(R`) = Φ(R).A sensor node 
only needs H + 1 storage units for the extra hash values. Based on this scheme, Du et al further 
extended the idea to reduce the height of the Merkle tree to improve the communication 
overhead of the scheme. The proposed scheme is more efficient than signature verification on 
certificates. However, the scheme requires that some hash values be distributed in a 
pre-distribution stage. This results in some scalability issues when new sensors are added to an 
existing WSN. 
Tanachaiwiwat et al. have presented a novel secure routing protocol- trusted routing for 
location aware sensor networks (TRANS) [5]. It is primarily meant for use in data centric 
networks. It makes use of an asymmetric cryptographic scheme that relies on a loose-time 
synchronization mechanism. To ensure message confidentiality.The authors have used 
µTESLA to ensure message authentication and confidentiality. Using µTESLA, TRANS is able 
to ensure that a message is sent along a path of trusted nodes utilizing location aware routing. 
The base station broadcasts an encrypted message to all its neighbors. Only the trusted 
neighbors will possess the shared key necessary to decrypt the message. The trusted neighbors 
then add their locations (for the return trip), encrypt the new message with their shared key and 
forward the message to their neighbors closest to the destination. Once the message reaches 
the destination, the recipient is able to authenticate the source (base station) using the MAC 
corresponding to the base station. To acknowledge or reply to the message, the destination 
node can simply forward a return message along the same trusted path from the message was 
received [5]. 
Sen et al. have proposed a routing protocol that is resilient against packet dropping attack by 
malicious nodes in a WSN [121]. It essentially utilizes a single-path routing concept and hence 
saves energy compared to the multi-path routing protocols. If a malicious node is detected in 
the next-hop on the routing path, the node is efficiently bypassed and the packets are routed 
around the node to the base station still in a single-path. The protocol is based on a robust 
  
neighborhood monitoring system (NMS) that works on promiscuous monitoring of the 
neighborhood of a node and detection of any possible malicious packet dropping attack by a 
cooperative algorithm using neighbor list checking.  
One particular challenge to secure routing in wireless sensor networks is that it is very easy 
for a single node to disrupt the routing process by disrupting the route discovery process. 
Papadimitratos et al. have proposed a secure route discovery protocol that guarantees correct 
topology discovery in an ad hoc sensor network [4]. The protocol relies on the MAC and an 
accumulation of the node identities along the route traversed by a message. In this way, a 
source node discovers the sensor network topology as each node along the route from source 
to destination appends its identity to the message. In order to ensure that the message has not 
been tampered with, a MAC is constructed and can be verified both at the destination and the 
source (for the return message from the destination). 
5.5 Defense against Sybil attacks 
Any defense mechanism against the Sybil attack must ensure that a framework must be in 
place in the network to validate that a particular identity is the only identity being held by a 
given physical node [47]. Newsome et al. have described three orthogonal dimensions of the 
Sybil attack taxonomy [47]. The three dimensions are: (i) direct vs. indirect communication, 
(ii) fabricated vs. stolen identities, and (iii) simultaneity. In direct communication, the Sybil 
nodes communicate directly with legitimate nodes. In this attack, when a legitimate node 
sends a radio message to a Sybil node, one of the malicious devices listens to the message. In 
indirect communication, no legitimate nodes are able to communicate directly with the Sybil 
nodes. Messages sent to a Sybil node are routed through one or more of malicious nodes which 
pretend to pass the message on to the Sybil node. In case of fabricated identities, the attacker 
creates arbitrary new Sybil identities. However, if a mechanism is in place to detect false 
identities, an attacker cannot fabricate new identities. In this case, the attacker needs to assign 
other legitimate identities to Sybil nodes. This identity theft may go undetected if the attacker 
destroys or temporarily disables the impersonated nodes.  In case of simultaneous attacks, the 
attacker tries to have all the Sybil identities participate in the network simultaneously. 
Alternatively the attacker may present a large number of identities over a period of time, while 
deploying a small number of identities at a given point of time. Newsome et al. primarily 
describe direct validation techniques, including a radio resource test. In the radio test, a node 
assigns each of its neighbors a different channel and listens to each of them. If the node detects 
a transmission on the channel, it is assumed that the node transmitting on the channel is a 
physical node. Similarly, if the node does not detect a transmission on the specified channel, 
the node assumes that the identity assigned to the channel is not a physical identity. 
Another technique to defend against the Sybil attack is to use random key pre-distribution 
techniques [37 - 38, 97]. In random key pre-distribution, a random set of keys or key-related 
information are assigned to each sensor nodes, so that in the key set-up phase, each node can 
discover or compute the common keys it shares with its neighbors. The common keys are used 
as shared secret session keys to ensure node-to-node secrecy. Newsome et al. propose that the 
identity of each node is associated with the keys assigned to the node [47]. With a limited set 
of captured keys, there is a little probability that an arbitrarily generated identity will work.  
5.6 Detection of node replication attack 
Parno et al. have proposed a mechanism for distributed detection of node replication attacks in 
WSNs [51]. To address the fundamental limitations of currently existing mechanisms, e.g., 
single point of failure in centralized schemes, or neighborhood voting protocols that fail to 
  
detect distributed replications, the authors have proposed two algorithms that work through 
the collective actions of multiple nodes in a WSN. The algorithms are: (i) randomized 
multicast and (ii) line-selected multicast. The randomized multicast algorithm distributes 
location information of a node to randomly-selected witnesses, exploiting birthday paradox to 
detect replicated nodes. The line-selected multicast uses the network topology to detect 
replication as discussed below.   
The randomized broadcast has evolved from traditional node-to-node broadcasting. In 
traditional node-to-node broadcasting, each node in the network uses an authenticated 
broadcast message to flood the network with its location information. Each node stores the 
location information of its neighbors and if it receives a conflicting claim, it revokes the 
offending node. This protocol can achieve 100% detection of all duplicate location claims if 
the broadcasts reach all the nodes. However, the total communication cost for the protocol is 
O(n2), which is too high for a large WSN. To reduce the communication cost of 
node-to-node-broadcast, deterministic multicast mechanism may be applied where a node’s 
location claim is shared with a limited subset of deterministically chosen witness nodes. The 
witnesses are chosen as a function of the node’s ID. If the adversary replicates a node, the 
witnesses will receive two different location claims for the same node ID. The conflicting 
location claims trigger the revocation of the replicated node. The randomized multicast 
approach suggested by Parno et al. improves the robustness of the deterministic multicast. It 
randomizes the witnesses for a given node’s location claim, so that the adversary cannot 
anticipate their identities. When a node announces its location, each of its neighbors sends a 
copy of the location claim to a set of randomly selected witness nodes. If the adversary 
replicates a node, then two sets of witnesses will be selected. In a network of n nodes, if each 
location produces √n   witnesses, then, the birthday paradox predicts at least one collision with 
high probability, i.e., at least one witness will receive a pair of conflicting location claims. The 
two conflicting location claims form sufficient evidence to revoke the node, so the witness can 
flood the pair of location claims through the network, and each node can independently 
confirm the revocation decision. Unfortunately, however, the communication and storage 
overheads for randomized multicast is too high- O(n2) and O(√n) respectively. The authors 
have suggested some enhancements for improving the communication and storage overhead. 
To reduce the communication cost of the randomized multicast approach, Parno et al. have 
proposed an alternative algorithm- the line selected multicast. It is based on the rumor routing 
protocol [122]. The idea is that a location claim traveling from source s to destination d will 
also travel through several intermediate nodes. If each of these nodes records the location 
claims, then the path of the location claim through the network can be thought of as a line 
segment. The destination of the location claim is one of the randomly chosen witnesses. As the 
location claim routes through the network towards a witness node, the intermediate sensors 
check the claim. If a conflicting location claim ever crosses a line segment, then the node at the 
intersection detects the conflict and initiates a revocation broadcast. The line selected 
multicast algorithm has communication overhead of O(n√n) as long as each line segment is of 
length O(√n) nodes. The storage overhead of the algorithm is O(√n). 
5.7 Defense against traffic analysis attack 
Deng et al. have proposed a mechanism for defending against traffic analysis attack in a WSN 
[55]. The author have argued that since the base station is a central point of failure, once the 
location of the base station is discovered, an adversary can disable or destroy the base station, 
thereby rendering the data-gathering functionalities of the entire WSN ineffective. Two 
classes of traffic analysis attacks in WSNs are identified: (i) rate monitoring attack, and (ii) 
time correlation attack. In time correlation attack, an adversary monitors the packet sending 
  
rate of nodes near the adversary, and moves closer to the nodes that have a higher packet 
sending rate. In a time correlation attack, an adversary observes the correlation in sending time 
between a node and its neighbor node that is assumed to be forwarding the same packet, and 
deduces the path by following the sound of each forwarding operation as the packet propagates 
towards the base station. The mechanism proposed by the authors prevents rate monitoring 
attack and time correlation attack. The mechanism involves four techniques. First, a multiple 
parent routing scheme is introduced that allows a sensor node to forward a packet to one of its 
multiple parents. This makes the patterns less pronounced in terms of routing packets towards 
the base station. Second, a controlled random walk is introduced into the multi-hop path 
traversed by a packet through the WSN towards the base station. This distributes packet traffic, 
thereby rendering the rate monitoring attack less effective. Third, random fake paths are 
introduced to confuse an adversary from tracking a packet as it moves towards a base station. 
This mitigates the effectiveness of time correlation attacks. Finally, multiple, random areas of 
high communication activities are created to deceive an adversary as to the true location of the 
base station, which further increases the difficulty of rate monitoring attacks. The combination 
of these four strategies makes the proposed mechanism extremely robust to any traffic analysis 
attack. 
5.8 Defense against attacks on senor privacy 
The attacks on information privacy in WSNs have been discussed in Section 4. In this 
subsection some schemes protecting information privacy in WSNs are discussed.  
5.8.1 Anonymity mechanisms 
Precise location information enables accurate identification of a user. This is a serious threat to 
privacy. One way to handle this problem is to make data source anonymous. An anonymity 
mechanism depersonalizes the data before it is released from the source. Gruteser et al. have 
presented an analysis on the feasibility of anonymizing location information in location-based 
services in an automotive telematics environment [123]. Beresford et al. have proposed 
anonymity techniques for an indoor location system based on the Active Bat [124]. In [125], an 
efficient and reliable routing protocol for wireless ad hoc and mesh networks has presented 
that ensures anonymity of the user. The user anonymity, authentication and data privacy is 
achieved by application of a novel protocol that is based on Rivest’s ring signature scheme 
[126]. 
Since ensuring total anonymity is almost an impossible proposition, in almost all practical 
scenarios, a tradeoff is to be made between anonymity and disclosure of public information in 
most of the privacy protection mechanisms. Four approaches have been proposed by 
researchers in this direction [52, 127 - 129] for WSNs. These approaches are: (i) 
decentralization of storage of sensitive data, (ii) establishment of secure channel for 
communication, (iii) changing the pattern of data traffic, and (iv) exploiting mobility of the 
nodes. The sensitive location data is to be stored in a spanning tree of nodes so that no single 
node holds a complete view of the location information. Communication using secure 
protocols such as SPINS [35] will make eavesdropping and active attack on a WSN extremely 
difficult. The data traffic pattern may be changed by selectively inserting some bogus data in 
the network traffic so that traffic analysis by an external entity will not be successful. Mobile 
sensor nodes make attack on location privacy very difficult. The Cricket system [128] is a 
location-support system for mobile, and location-dependent applications inside large 
buildings. It allows applications running on mobile and static nodes to learn their physical 
location from a set of listeners. The listeners hear and analyze information from beacons in a 
building. The location sensors are placed on the mobile devices instead of some static 
  
locations in the building, and the location information is not disclosed during the position 
determination process. 
5.8.2 Policy-based approaches 
In policy-based defense mechanisms the access control decisions and authentication 
techniques are made on the basis of a specified set of privacy policies. Molnar et al. have 
presented the concept of private authentication and demonstrated its application in radio 
frequency identification (RFID) domain [130]. Duri et al. propose a policy-based framework 
for protecting sensor information, where a computer in side a car acts as a trusted agent for 
location privacy [131].  Snekkenes introduces various parameters for access control that 
enable specifying policies in the context of a mobile network [132]. Some of the parameters 
are: time of request, location, speed, and identity of the located object. Myles et al. describe the 
architecture of a centralized location server that controls access requests from client 
applications through a set of validator modules based on a set of XML-coded privacy policies 
[133]. Hengartner et al. have discussed various challenges that arise for the specification and 
implementation of policies controlling access to location information [134]. The authors have 
also presented a design framework of an access control mechanism.  
5.8.3 Information flooding 
Ozturk et al. proposed various modifications to WSN routing protocols for protecting the 
location information of a source node [53]. In particular, the authors have discussed a set of 
flooding protocols.   The randomized data routing and phantom traffic generation mechanism 
are used so that it is difficult for an adversary to track any data source. For ensuring privacy of 
source location the authors have discussed four types of flooding-based routing protocols: (i) 
baseline flooding, (ii) probabilistic flooding, (iii) flooding with fake messages, and (iv) 
phantom flooding. They are described as follows:  
 
• Baseline flooding: In the baseline flooding, every node in the network forwards a 
message only once, and no node retransmits a message that it has previously transmitted. 
When a message reaches an intermediate node, the node first checks whether it has 
received and forwarded the message before. If this is its first time, the node broadcasts 
the message to all its neighbors. Otherwise, it just discards the message. 
• Probabilistic flooding: In probabilistic flooding, only a subset of nodes in the entire 
network participates in data forwarding, while the others simply discard the messages 
they receive. One possible weakness of this approach is that some messages may get 
lost in the network and as a result affect the overall network connectivity. However, 
Ozturk et al. [53] have proved analytically that this is not a significant problem.  
• Flooding with fake messages:  Flooding cannot provide privacy protection because an 
adversary can easily identify the shortest path between a source and a sink, and use it to 
backtrack to the source location. The main reason for lack of location privacy is that 
there is only one source node. One approach that can alleviate the risk of 
source-location privacy breaching is to augment the flooding protocols so that more 
sources can be introduced that inject fake messages into the network. If the fake 
messages have the same length as the real messages and they are also encrypted, it will 
be impossible for an adversary to distinguish between them. 
• Phantom flooding: Phantom flooding has the same principle as that of probabilistic 
flooding. It too attempts to direct messages to different locations of the network so that 
the adversary cannot receive a steady stream of messages to track the source. However, 
  
probabilistic flooding is not very effective since shorter paths are more likely to deliver 
more messages. Phantom flooding entices an attacker away for the real source and 
towards a fake source, called the phantom source. In phantom flooding, every message 
experiences two phase: (1) a walking phase, which may be a random walk or a directed 
walk, and (2) a subsequent flooding meant to deliver the message to the sink. When the 
source sends out a message, the message is unicast in a random fashion within the first 
hwalk hops. This is called the random walk phase. After the hwalk hops, the message is 
flooded using the baseline flooding technique. This is the flooding phase. Phantom 
flooding significantly improves the privacy and network safety period because every 
message may take a different (shortest) path to reach any node in the network.  
 
Deng et al. have addressed the problem of defending a base station against physical attacks 
by concealing the geographic location of the base station [55]. The authors have investigated 
several countermeasures against traffic analysis techniques aimed at disguising the location of 
a base station. In the proposed mechanism, a degree of randomness is introduced while 
selecting the multi-hop route to the base station. Then, random fake packets are introduced as 
a packet moves towards a base station. The metrics such as total entropy of the network, total 
energy consumed, and the ability to guard against heuristic-based techniques to locate the base 
station are evaluated analytically as well as by extensive simulations. 
Xi et al. [135] have described a successful attack on the flooding-based phantom routing 
proposed by Ozturk et al [53]. The authors have also proposed greedy random walk (GROW) 
protocol, a two-way random walk, i.e., from both source and sink, to reduce the chance an 
eavesdropper can collect the location information.   In the proposed mechanism, the sink first 
initiates an N-hop random walk, and the source then initiates an M-hop random walk. Once the 
source packet reaches an intersection of these two paths, it is forwarded through the path 
created by the sink. Local broadcasting is used to detect when the two paths intersect. In order 
to minimize the chance of backtracking along the random walk, the nodes are stored in a 
bloom filter as the walk progresses. At each stage, the intermediate nodes are checked against 
the bloom filter to ensure that backtracking is minimized. 
5.9 Intrusion detection 
The security mechanisms implemented in secure routing protocols and secure data 
aggregation protocols are configured beforehand to prevent an attacker from breaking the 
security of the network. However, these security mechanisms alone cannot ensure security of a 
WSN. Since it is possible for an attacker to compromise a sensor node, it is easy for him to 
inject false data into a WSN. Authentication and data encryption are not enough for ensuring 
data security. Another approach to protect WSNs involves mechanisms for detecting and 
reacting to intrusions. 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors a host or network for suspicious activity 
patterns outside normal and expected behavior [29]. It is based on the assumption that there 
exists a noticeable difference in the behavior of an intruder and legitimate user in the network 
such that an IDS can match it with pre-programmed or possible learned rules. Based on the 
analysis model used for analyzing the audit data to detect intrusions, intrusion detection 
systems are usually classified into two types: (i) rule-based intrusion detection systems and (ii) 
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems [136]. Rule-based intrusion detection systems are 
used to detect known patterns of intrusions as in [137] and [138]. The anomaly-based systems 
are used to detect new or unknown intrusions as in [139] and [140] rule-based IDS has a low 
false-alarm rate compared to an anomaly-based system, and an anomaly-based IDS has a high 
  
intrusion detection rate in comparison to a rule-based system. Distributed IDSs have higher 
detection efficiency. Sen et al. have presented the model of a distributed IDS that consists of a 
large number of autonomous and cooperating agents [141]. The architecture exploits 
inter-agent communication and distributed computation to achieve a high detection efficiency 
with very low rates of false positives and false negatives. 
However, WSNs are generally application-specific and lack basic information on topology, 
normal usage, expected communication patterns, etc. It is impractical to pre-install some fixed 
patterns in sensors before they are deployed. Moreover, due to constraints in sensors, to learn 
and detect these parameters after deployment is both time and energy consuming. Thus, 
existing intrusion detection schemes in ad hoc networks may not be adapted to WSNs. 
The research on intrusion detection in WSNs is still preliminary. Current research focuses 
on how to detect and eliminate injected false information. Thus, cooperation among sensors, 
especially neighboring nodes, is necessary to decide the validity of a report. The following 
subsection discusses some existing mechanisms of intrusion detection for WSNs. 
5.9.1 Intrusion detection in WSNs 
Brutch et al. have discussed various types of possible attacks against WSNs and presented 
three different architectures for intrusion detection [142]. The first is a stand-alone architecture. 
In this case, each node functions as an independent intrusion detection system and is 
responsible for detecting attacks directed towards it. The nodes do not exchange and intrusion 
data and no cooperative detection mechanisms are deployed. The second architecture is a 
distributed and cooperative architecture. In this architecture, an intrusion detection agent is 
deployed on each node. While the local agents are responsible for detecting local attacks on 
the nodes, they also cooperate among themselves by exchanging intrusion related data to 
detect global intrusion attempts. The third architecture proposed by the author is a hierarchical 
architecture. This is suitable for a multi-layered WSN, where the network is divided into 
clusters with the cluster-head node being responsible for routing within a cluster. The 
multi-layered networks are primarily used for event correlation. 
Zhu et al. proposed an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication (IHOP) scheme in [143]. 
IHOP guarantees that the base station will detect any injected false data packets when no more 
than a certain number t of nodes are compromised. The sensor network is organized in a 
cluster-based hierarchy. Each cluster-head builds a route to the base station and each 
intermediate node has an upper associate node and a lower associate node that is t + 1 hops 
away. IHOP uses a number of shared keys: (i) every node shares a master key with the base 
station, (ii) each node knows its one-hop neighbors and has established a pair-wise key with 
each of them, (iii) a node can establish a pair-wise key with another node that is multiple hops 
away if needed.  
Further, IHOP also assumes that the base station has a mechanism to authenticate broadcast 
messages, e.g., µTESLA. A cluster-head collects information from its members and sends a 
report to the base station only when at least t + 1 sensors observer the same result. Meanwhile 
a cluster-head also collects the MACs from detecting nodes. Each detecting node sends two 
MACs to the cluster-head: a MAC using the key shared with the base station, referred to as the 
individual MAC, and a MAC using the key shared with its upper associate nodes, referred to as 
the pair-wise MAC. The cluster-head then compresses the t + 1 individual MACs by XORing 
them to reduce the size of the report. However, the pair-wise MACs are not compressed for 
transmission. If they were, a node replaying the message would not be able to extract the 
pair-wise MACs and a compressed MAC for the base station. When an intermediate node 
receives a report, it verifies the MAC of its lower associate node. If it fails, the report is 
  
eliminated. Otherwise, it removes the MAC, generates a new MAC using its upper associate 
node pair-wise key, and appends it to the report. However, the pair-wise MACs are not 
compromised for transmission. If they were, a node relaying the message would not be able to 
extract the pair-wise MACs of interest to it. Thus, a legitimate report includes t + 1 pair-wise 
MACs and a compressed MAC for the base station. When an intermediate node receives a 
report, it verifies the MAC of its lower associate node. If it fails, the report is eliminated. 
Otherwise, it removes the MAC, generates a new MAC using its upper associate node 
pair-wise key, and appends it to the report. 
IHOP ensures that the base station can detect false data packets when no more than t nodes 
are compromised. However, the authors [143] have not shown how to select the parameter t 
for a sensor network. 
Wang et al. proposed a scheme to detect whether a node is faulty or malicious with the 
collaboration of neighbor nodes [144]. In the proposed scheme, when a node suspects that one 
of its neighbors is faulty, it sends out messages to request the opinions on the behavior of this 
suspected node from other neighbors of the suspect. After collecting the results, the node 
analyzes the results to diagnose whether the suspect has a fault. The authors formalized the 
problem as how to construct a dominating tree to cover all the neighbors of the suspect and 
further proposed two tree-based propagation collection protocols to construct a dominating 
tree and collect information via the tree structure.  
Albers et al. have proposed an intrusion detection architecture based on local intrusion 
detection system (LIDS) on each node in a wireless ad hoc network [145]. In order to detect a 
network-wide intrusion, the LIDS on the nodes collaborate with each other and exchange two 
types of data- security data and intrusion alerts. The security data is used to exchange 
information with other network hosts. The intrusion alerts are used to inform LIDS in the 
neighboring nodes to exchange intrusion related information. Although the framework is for 
an ad hoc network, its approach of local anomaly detection and cooperatively detecting any 
network-wide intrusion can be adapted to develop an intrusion detection mechanism for a 
WSN [6].  
Intrusion detection in WSNs is still largely open to research. Key research issues include the 
following: 
 
• Due to the constraints in WSNs, intrusion detection has many aspects not of concern in 
other network types. The problem of intrusion detection needs to be well defined in 
WSNs. 
• The proposed IDs protocols in the literature focus on filtering injected false information 
only [2, 11, 143]. These protocols need to be improved to address scalability issues.  
5.10 Secure data aggregation 
Data communication constitutes an important share of the total energy consumption of a 
sensor network. Simulation [35] shows that data transmission accounts for 71 percent of the 
energy cost of computation and communication for the secure network encryption protocol 
(SNEP) protocols. An efficient data aggregation mechanism can greatly help in optimizing the 
energy consumption. 
In a WSN, there are certain nodes called aggregators which are responsible to carry out data 
aggregation operations. If an aggregator node is compromised, it is easy for an adversary to 
inject false data into the network. Another possible attack is to compromise a sensor node and 
inject forged data through it. Without authentication, the attackers may fool the aggregators 
into reporting false data to the base station. Secu
  
confidentiality, and integrity of data to be maintained. Moreover, secure data aggregation also 
requires cooperation among the sensor nodes to identify the compromised sensors.  
Before discussing some secure aggregation mechanisms existing in the literature, an 
overview of some well-known aggregation techniques are presented. 
In [6], the authors have proposed a clustering-based algorithm that uses directed diffusion 
technique to gather a global perspective utilizing only the local nodes in each cluster. The 
nodes are assigned different level with level 0 being assigned to the nodes lying at the lowest 
level. While the nodes at the highest level can communicate across the clusters, the nodes at 
the lower levels communicate among each other in the same cluster via the cluster head node. 
This effectively enables localized cluster computation while the higher level nodes 
communicate the local information of the clusters to achieve a global picture. 
In [8], the authors have proposed a mechanism called tiny aggregation (TAG) service. It is a 
generic data aggregation mechanism that involves a language similar to SQL to generate 
queries in a WSN. The base station generates a query using this language. The sensor nodes 
sends the reply using routes constructed based on a routing tree. At each point in the tree, the 
data is aggregated using some aggregation function that was defined in the initial query sent. 
Srivastava et al. have proposed a summary structure for supporting fairly complex 
aggregate functions, such as median and range queries [10]. In addition, computation of 
relatively easier functions such as min/max, sum, and average are also supported in the 
proposed framework. However, more complex aggregate, such as the most frequently reported 
data value is not supported. The computed aggregate functions are approximate but the 
estimated errors are statistically bounded.  
A number of secure aggregation protocols for WSNs exist in the literature. However, 
fundamentally there is a conflict of interests in data confidentiality and data aggregation. 
Confidentiality requires the data to be transmitted in ciphertext mode, whereas data 
aggregation is usually done on plaintext contents. A straight-forward method is to invoke 
end-to-end encryption before executing data aggregation. This strategy, however, has a 
shortcoming. The encryption and decryption operations involve a substantial computation 
overhead. An alternative method is to provide data aggregation on concealed data, which 
requires a particular class of encryption transformation. However, this method usually reduces 
the security level [103]. 
Figure 5 shows a taxonomy of secure data aggregation protocols for WSNs. There are two 
categories of secure aggregation protocols: (i) plaintext-based, and (ii) ciphertext-based.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Secure data aggergation in WSNs; a taxonomy [171] 
(Source: Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 2-23, 2006) 
 
 
  
5.10.1 Secure aggregation on plaintext data 
Hu et al. have proposed a secure aggregation (SA) protocol that uses the µTESLA protocol [7]. 
The protocol is resilient to both intruder devices and single device key compromises. In the 
proposition, the sensor nodes are organized into a tree where the internal nodes act as the 
aggregators. However, the protocol is vulnerable if a parent and one of its child nodes are 
compromised, since due to the delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, the parent node will not 
be able to immediately verify the authenticity of the data sent by its children nodes.  
Przydatek et al. have presented a secure information aggregation (SIA) framework for 
sensor networks [9]. The framework consists of three categories of node: a home server, base 
station and sensor nodes. A base station is a resource-enhanced node which is used as an 
intermediary between the home server and the sensor nodes, and it is also the candidate to 
perform the aggregation task. SIA assumes that each sensor has a unique identifier and shares 
a separate secret cryptographic key with both the home server and the aggregator. The keys 
enable message authentication and encryption if data confidentiality is required. Moreover, it 
further assumes that the home server and the base station can use a mechanism, such as 
µTESLA, to broadcast authenticated messages. The proposed solution follows 
aggregate-commit-prove approach.  
In the first phase- aggregate- the aggregator collects data from sensors and locally computes 
the aggregation result using some specific aggregate function. Each sensor shares a key with 
the aggregator. This allows the aggregator to verify whether the sensor reading is authentic. 
However, there is a possibility that a sensor may have been compromised and an adversary has 
captured the key. In the proposed scheme there is no mechanism to detect such an event.  
In the second phase, i.e. commit phase, the aggregator commits to the collected dat. This 
phase ensures that the aggregator actually uses the data collected from the sensors, and the 
statement to be verified by the home server about the correctness of computed results is 
meaningful. One efficient mechanism for committing is a Merkle hash-tree construction [146]. 
In this method, the data collected from the sensors is placed at the leaves of a tree. The 
aggregator then computes a binary hash tree staring with the leaf nodes. Each internal node in 
the hash tree is computed as the hash value of the concatenation of its two children nodes. The 
root of the tree is called the commitment of the collected data. As the hash function in use is 
collision free, once the aggregator commits to the collected values, it cannot change any of the 
collected values.  
In the third and final phase, the aggregator and the home server engage in a protocol in 
which the aggregator communicates the aggregation result. In addition, aggregator uses an 
interactive proof protocol to prove correctness of the reported results. This is done in two 
logical steps. In the first step, the home server ensures that the committed data is a good 
representation of the sensor data readings collected. In the second step, the home server checks 
the reliability of the aggregator output. This is done by checking whether the aggregation 
result is close to the committed results. The interactive proof protocol varies depending on the 
aggregation function is being used.  Moreover, the authors also presented efficient protocols 
for secure computation of the median and the average of the measurements, for the estimation 
of the network size, and for finding the minimum and maximum sensor reading.  
Deng et al. proposed a collection of mechanisms for securing in-network processing (SINP) 
for WSNs [147]. Security mechanism were proposed to address the downstream requirement 
that sensor nodes authenticate commands disseminated from parent aggregators and the 
upstream requirement that aggregators authenticate data produced by sensors before 
aggregating that data. In the downstream stage, two techniques are involved: one way 
  
functions and µTESLA. The upstream stage requires that a pair-wise key be shared between an 
aggregator and its sensor nodes.  
Cam et al. proposed an energy-efficient secure pattern-based data aggregation (ESPDA) 
protocol for wireless sensor networks [148, 149]. ESPDA is applicable for hierarchy-based 
sensor networks. In ESPDA, a cluster-head first requests sensor nodes to send the 
corresponding pattern code for the sensed data. If multiple sensor nodes send the same pattern 
code to the cluster-head, only one of them is permitted to send the data to the cluster-head. 
ESPDA is secure because it does not require encrypted data to be decrypted by cluster-heads 
to perform data aggregation. 
Cam et al. have introduced another secure differential data aggregation (SDDA) scheme 
based on pattern codes [150]. SDDA prevents redundant data transmission from sensor nodes 
by implementing the following schemes: (1) SDDA transmits differential data rather than raw 
data, (2) SDDA performs data aggregation on pattern codes representing the main 
characteristics of the sensed data, and (3) SDDA employs a sleep protocol to coordinate the 
activation of sensing units in such a way that only one of the sensor nodes capable of sensing 
the data is activated at a given time. In the SDDA data transmission scheme, the raw data from 
sensor nodes is compared to reference data with the difference data being transmitted. The 
reference data is obtained by taking the average of previously transmitted data. 
Du et al. proposed a witness-based data aggregation (WDA) scheme for WSNs to assure 
the validation of the data fusion nodes to the base station [151]. To prove the validity of the 
fusion results, the fusion node has to provide proofs from several witnesses. A witness is one 
who also conducts data fusion like a data fusion node, but does not forward its result to the 
base station. Instead, each witness computes the MAC of the result and then provides it to the 
data fusion node, which must forward the proofs to the base station. 
Wagner studied secure data aggregation in sensor networks and proposed a mathematical 
framework for formally evaluating their security [152]. The robustness of an aggregation 
operator against malicious data is quantified. Ye et al. propose a statistical en-route filtering 
mechanism to detect any forged data being sent from the sensor nodes to the base station of a 
WSN using multiple MACs along the path from the aggregator to the base station [11].    
5.10.2 Secure aggregation on ciphertext data 
Secure aggregation of ciphertext data in WSNs is required to preserve privacy of the sensor 
nodes. Efficient in-network data aggregation with preservation of data privacy is an important 
requirement in many WSN applications [153-155, 157, 162]. As a key approach to fulfilling 
this requirement of private data aggregation of sensor nodes, concealed data aggregation 
(CDA) schemes have been proposed in which multiple source nodes send encrypted data to a 
sink along a converge-cast tree with aggregation of ciphertext being performed over the route 
[153 - 155, 157, 158]. Two ciphertext-based secure data aggregation schemes have been 
proposed in [154] and [155]. The propositions are based on a particular encryption 
transformation: a privacy homomorphism (PH). A privacy homomorphism is an encryption 
transformation that allows direct computation on the encrypted data. Let Q and R denote two 
rings, and let + denote addition and x denote multiplication on the two rings. Let K be the key 
space. We denote an encryption transformation E : K x Q  R and the corresponding 
decryption transformation D : K x R  Q. Given a, b ε Q and k ε K, the following operation is 
termed as additively homomorphic. 
 
                                                  a + b = Dk (Ek(a) + Ek(b))                                                     (5) 
 
Similarly, the following operation is termed as multiplicatively homomorphic [159]. 
  
 
                                                   a x b = Dk(Ek(a) x Ek(b))                                                      (6) 
 
The concealed data aggregation (CDA) scheme proposed in [155] is based on the PH 
proposed in [160]. Although the study in [161] has shown that the proposed PH in [160] is 
insecure against chosen plaintext attacks for some parameter settings, the authors in [155] 
claimed that for the WSN data aggregation scenario, the security level is still adequate and the 
proposed PH method in [160] can be employed for encryption. CDA can be used to calculate 
SUM and AVERAGE in a hierarchical WSN. To calculate AVERAGE, an aggregator needs 
to know the number of sensor nodes n.  
Castelluccia et al. proposed a simple and provable secure additively homomorphic stream 
cipher (HSC) that allows for the efficient aggregation of encrypted data [154]. The new cipher 
uses modular addition and is therefore very well suited for CPU-constrained devices such as 
those in WSNs. The aggregation based on this cipher can be used to efficiently compute 
statistical values such as the mean, variance, and standard deviation of sensed data while 
achieving significant bandwidth gain. 
Secure data aggregation activity is an extremely important issue in WSNs. Several secure 
data aggregation protocols have been proposed by the researchers. However, no comparisons 
have been conducted on these proposed protocols. Further evaluations are required to get an 
idea about the performance of these protocols. The performance metrics might include 
security, processing overhead, communication overhead, energy consumption, data 
compression etc. Moreover, new data aggregation protocols are needed to address higher 
scalability and higher reliability against aggregator and sensor node cheating [103].   
5.11  Defense against physical attacks 
To protect against a possible physical attack, sensor nodes may be equipped with special 
hardware.   The sensor nodes in a WSN may be protected against tampering by 
tamper-proofing the physical packages of the sensors [29]. Researchers have also proposed 
mechanisms that focus on building tamper-resistant hardware in order to make the memory 
contents on the sensor chip inaccessible to a potential external attacker [20, 21, 24]. 
Special-purpose software and hardware may also be deployed outside the sensor nodes to 
detect physical tampering. Self-termination of sensor nodes is an effective mechanism to 
defend against possible data theft in the event of a physical attack. The basic idea in this case is 
that whenever a sensor senses an attack it kills itself and destroys all data and keys stored in its 
memory. This is particularly feasible in a large-scale WSN where there is enough redundancy 
of information and connectivity among the nodes. However, the main challenge is to 
accurately identify a physical attack. A simple solution is to periodically verify the 
neighborhood information for each node. In case of a mobile sensor network, this is an open 
problem.  
A number of techniques have been discussed for extracting protected data from card 
processor [20 - 24]. These techniques include manual micro-probing, laser cutting, focused 
ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, power analysis etc. Most of these techniques may be 
used to launch physical attacks on sensor nodes in a WSN.  
Anderson et al. have proposed counter-measures for each of these attacks [21]. In [20 - 24], 
the authors describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smart card 
processors. This includes manual micro-probing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam 
manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis, most of which are also possible physical 
attacks on the sensor. Based on an analysis of these attacks, Andersen et al give examples of 
  
low-cost protection countermeasures that make such attacks considerably more difficult, 
including.  
Deng et al. have proposed various approaches for protecting sensors by deploying 
components outside them [163]. Sastry et al. have presented ECHO protocol for secure and 
reliable location verification of sensor nodes in a WSN [25]. The scheme is based on the 
physical properties of sound and RF signal propagation from the sensor nodes. It is not 
possible for an adversary to cheat and falsely claim a shorter distance from the base station by 
transmitting its ultrasonic sound response early, because it will not be able to produce the 
required nonce for verification.  
In [2], the authors presented defense mechanisms against search-based physical attacks. 
The authors have also discussed a systematic modeling framework for blind physical attacks 
[27].  The defense mechanism against physical attacks as proposed by the authors involves 
two phases. In the first phase, the sensors detect the attacker and send out attack notification 
messages in the network. In the second phase, the sensors that receive the notification 
messages schedule their states to switch off mode. Seshadri et al. have proposed a mechanism 
called software-based attestation for embedded devices (SWATT), to detect a sudden and 
abrupt change in the memory contents of a sensor node [26]. An abrupt change in the memory 
content of a sensor indicates possibility of a physical attack. 
5.12 Trust management 
Application of trust and reputation-based frameworks for enforcing high-level of security in 
WSNs is another approach. In fact trust-based schemes can protect against attacks which are 
beyond the capabilities of the cryptographic security. For example issues like judging the 
quality and reliability of sensor nodes and wireless links, data aggregation reliability and 
correctness of aggregator nodes, timeliness in packet forwarding of the sensors etc are can be 
addressed effectively in a systematic manner with the help of a trust-based framework.  
However, trust-based models usually involve high computational overhead, and building an 
efficient scheme for resource-constrained WSNs is a very challenging task. A comprehensive 
discussion on basic concepts of trust and reputation and various security mechanisms based on 
these concepts for WSNs are presented in [164]. 
Pirzada et al. [165] have proposed an approach for building trust relationship between the 
nodes in an ad hoc network. It is assumed that the nodes in the network passively monitor the 
packets received and forwarded by the other nodes. The receiving and forwarding activities by 
the nodes are termed as events. Events are observed and given a weight, depending on the type 
of application requiring a trust relationship with other nodes. The weights reflect the 
significance of the observed events for the corresponding application. The trust values for all 
events from a node are combined using weights to compute an aggregate trust level for the 
node. The computed trust values are used as link weights for the computation of routes. Links 
which connect more trust-worthy nodes will be having smaller weights. A shortest-path 
routing algorithm would compute the most trustworthy paths in a network. 
In [166], the author has described methods of finding paths from a source node to a 
designated target node in a peer-to-peer computing paradigm. Extending this approach, Zhu et 
al. [19] provide a practical approach to compute trust in wireless networks by treating 
individual mobile device as a node of a delegation graph G and mapping a delegation path 
from a source node S to a target node T into an edge in the corresponding transitive closure of 
the graph G. From the edges of the transitive closure of the graph G, the trust values of the 
wireless links are computed. In the proposed trust-based framework, an undirected transitive 
signature scheme is used within the authenticated transitive graphs. 
  
     In [167], a secure and efficient searching scheme for peer-to-peer networks has been 
proposed that utilizes topology adaptation by contsruting an overlay of trusted peers where the 
neighbors are selceted based on their trust ratings and content similarities.  Using a robust trust 
management scheme, the scheme provides a highly reliable framework for protecting the 
privacy os users and data in the network.  
Yan et al. have proposed a security solution based on trust framework to ensure data 
protection, secure routing and other security features in an ad hoc network [18]. Mechanisms 
of logical and computational trust analysis and evaluation are applied on the nodes. Each node 
evaluates the trust of its peers based on factors such as experience statistics, data value, 
intrusion detection results, recommendations from its other neighbors. Ren et al. have 
presented a technique to establish trust relationships among nodes in an ad hoc network [16].  
The proposed framework is a probabilistic solution based on a distributed trust model. A secret 
dealer is introduced only in the system bootstrapping phase to initiate the trust propagation. 
Shorter and more robust trust chains are subsequently developed among the nodes. A fully 
self-organized trust establishment approach is then adopted to conform to the dynamic 
membership changes.  
Ganeriwal et al. have proposed a reputation-based framework for high integrity sensor 
networks [12]. The framework employs a beta distribution for reputation representation, 
updates, and integration. Using Beta distribution for reputation computation and exploiting 
statitistical theory of estimation, a secure and robust data aggregation scheme for WSNs has 
been presented in [168]. Tanachaiwiwat et al. [17] have proposed a mechanism of 
location-centric isolation of nodes exhibiting misbehavior and trust-based routing among 
nodes a in sensor networks. The trust valued of a node is computed based on the cryptographic 
suite being applied, availability statistics and the packet forwarding information of the node. If 
computed trust associated with a node falls below a threshold, the node’s location is 
considered insecure and it is avoided in routing process. The robust reputation computation 
model allows accurate detection of node misbehavior.  
     In  [169], a reputation- and trust-based security framework for ad hoc networks has been 
proposed for detecting malicious packet-dropping attacks. The mechanism is based on a trust 
model that computes repuation values for the nodes in a network. A similar scheme based on 
cooperation of nodes in a neighborhood and a distributed algorithm for reputation computation 
has been presented in [170]. 
Linag et al. have carried out extensive work on development of models and evaluating 
robustness and security of various aggregation algorithms in open and untrusted environment 
[13, 14]. These models may be adapted for deployment of trust-frameworks in WSN. In [15], 
the authors have proposed a model called personalized trust (PET) for nodes in a WSN. In [14], 
for aggregation of various ratings received from its peer sensor nodes, a comprehensive 
analytical and inference model of trust have been presented. The authors have identified two 
types of uncertainties in a rating system in an open computing environment: the uncertainties 
associated with rating aggregation algorithms and uncertainties resulting from other 
algorithm-independent design factors. The authors have shown that complex aggregation 
algorithms are not suitable in many cases due to memory limitations in the sensor nodes for 
storing knowledge related to computation of a trust-based framework. The simulation results 
show that it is better to treat ratings received from different evaluators (i.e., nodes) with equal 
weight and simply compute the average to arrive at the final trust value. This approach not 
only has a very low computational overhead, it also produces very satisfactory result in 
practice. The authors also observe that for a trust model most important and critical issue is 
how to adaptively adjust the parameters of the model based on the change in environment.   
  
6. Conclusions and Future Trends  
Although research efforts have been made on cryptography, key management, secure routing, 
secure data aggregation, and intrusion detection in WSNs, there are still some challenges to be 
addressed. First, the selection of the appropriate cryptographic methods depends on the 
processing capability of sensor nodes, indicating that there is no unified solution for all sensor 
networks. Instead, the security mechanisms are highly application-specific. Second, sensors 
are characterized by the constraints on energy, computation capability, memory, and 
communication bandwidth. The design of security services in WSNs must satisfy these 
constraints. Third, most of the current protocols assume that the sensor nodes and the base 
station are stationary. However, there may be situations, such as battlefield environments, 
where the base station and possibly the sensors need to be mobile. The mobility of sensor 
nodes has a great influence on sensor network topology and thus raises many issues in secure 
routing protocols. Following research issues for security in WSNs are particularly important:   
 
• Exploit the availability of private key operations on sensor nodes: recent studies on 
public key cryptography have shown that public key operations may be practical in 
sensor nodes. However, private key operations are still very expensive to realize in 
sensor nodes. As public key cryptography can greatly ease the design of security in 
WSNs, improving the efficiency of private key operations on sensor nodes is highly 
desirable. 
• Secure routing protocols for mobile sensor networks: mobility of sensor nodes has a 
great influence on sensor network topology and thus on the routing protocols. Mobility 
can be at the base station, sensor nodes, or both. Current protocols assume the sensor 
network is stationary. New secure routing protocols for mobile sensor networks need to 
be developed. 
• Time synchronization issues: current broadcast authentication schemes such as 
µTESLA and its extensions require sensor networks to be loosely time synchronized. 
This requirement is often hard to meet and new techniques that do not have such 
requirements are in great demand. 
• Scalability and efficiency in broadcast authentication protocols: novel schemes with 
higher scalability and efficiency need to be developed for authenticated broadcast 
protocols.The recent progress in public key cryptography may facilitate the design of 
authenticated broadcast protocols. 
• Defending DoS attacks: defending DoS attack is a great challenge. In the simplest from 
of this attack, an adversary attempts to disrupt communication by transmitting a 
broadcast signal of high strength.  The adversary can also inhibit communication  
violating the MAC protocol by transmitting frames while a neighbor is also by 
transmitting or by continuously requesting channel access with a request-to-send (RTS). 
New techniques for dealing with these attacks are needed.  
• Continuous stream security in WSNs: current work on security in sensor networks 
focuses on discrete events such as temperature and humidity. Continuous stream events 
such as video and images are not discussed. Video and image sensors for WSNs might 
not be widely available now, but will be likely in the future. Substantial differences in 
authentication and encryption exist between discrete events and continuous events, 
indicating that there will be distinctions between continuous stream security and the 
current protocols in WSNs. 
• QoS and security: performance is generally degraded with the addition of security 
  
services in WSNs. Current studies on security in WSNs focus on individual topics such 
as key management, secure routing, secure data aggregation, and intrusion detection. 
QoS and security services need to be evaluated together in WSNs.  
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